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Introduction 
Signing multiple trade agreements has become the rule for most countries, and Morocco 
is no exception to that rule. The Kingdom is therefore now involved in a complex network 
of trade agreements that range from multilateral organizations to regional treaties and 
bilateral trade concessions. This addition of overlapping agreements not only liberalizes 
Morocco's trade policy, but also makes it more complex, and, in turn, makes its effects 
more complex to assess. In fact, some may wonder whether Morocco's many commitments 
may not be a source of unintended trade distortions. 
This question is presently gaining increased momentum because Morocco is in the process 
of simultaneously applying what may appear to be its two most important steps toward 
regional trade integration. With its Northern partners, the Kingdom has signed the Euromed 
Agreement, which provides for a gradual liberalisation of its trade relations with the European 
Union. With its Arab partners, Morocco is implementing the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, 
which aims at creating a free trade zone with fourteen members of the Arab League. 
Morocco's simultaneous participation in two processes of trade liberalisation constitutes 
a shock of considerable importance to its economy. The question that naturally follows 
is to determine the effects of that shock. One may in particular be interested in knowing 
whether the effects of the two processes of trade liberalisation in which Morocco is 
involved are additive. In other words, one may wonder whether it is equivalent to taking 
part in two processes of trade liberalisation subsequently or at the same time. The answer 
to that question hinges on the debate on the consequences of what is now referred to 
as "spaghetti regionalism". 
The present report aims at assessing the implementation of Morocco's Regional Trade 
Agreements and the implications of their overlapping. It is divided into three parts. The 
first one provides a comprehensive description of the country's commitments and the 
status of their implementation. In the second part, we examine the potential conflict 
between Morocco's various trade agreements. The third part focuses on the possible 
effects of the two main agreements (i.e. the Euromed process and of the Greater Arab 
Free Trade Area) in which Morocco participates. It first reviews the possible effects of 
multiple regional trade agreements. Then, it provides an assessment of the possible effects 
of the two main agreements. Whenever possible, it provides quantitative estimates of the 
effects of those agreements on the Moroccan economy. 
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Part I: Description of Morocco's trade commitments 
I. Introduction 
In this section, we list and describe the trade agreements in which Morocco partakes. 
The presentation of each agreement follows the same outline. Namely, the date of entry 
into the agreement and the set of partner countries are recalled in a first subsection. The 
aim of the agreement is then sketched in a second subsection. The following subsection 
describes the scope of the agreement. Here we mean to describe the list of goods and 
services that come under the scope of the agreement. The fourth subsection is devoted 
to the rules of origin that Morocco applies in that agreement. Rules of origin are understood 
here according to Article I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, which defines them "as 
those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied 
by any Member to determine the country of origin of goods provided that such rules of 
origin are not related to contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting 
of tariff preferences going beyond the application of Paragraph I of Article I of GATT 1994." 
Each section subsequently ends with a description of the state of implementation of the 
relevant agreement by Morocco. In particular, we describe the schedule of future reforms 
and, whenever necessary, we point out the discrepancies between Moroccan law and 
Morocco's obligations. 
2. World Trade Organisation 
2.1. Date of entry into force and membership 
Morocco has been a member of the WTO, together with 149 other member countries, 
as of the I 3th of October 2004. It has been a member of the WTO since its origin, on the 
1St of January 1995 and had been member of the GATT since 1987. 
Morocco is not party to any of the plurilateral agreements concluded under WTO auspices. 
Plurilateral agreements refer to the four agreements, originally negotiated in the Tokyo 
Round, which had a narrower group of signatories after the Uruguay Round. Plurilaterals 
are therefore agreements between subsets of WTO members. By contrast, all other 
Tokyo Round agreements became multilateral obligations when the World Trade Organization 
was established in 1995. 
The four plurilaterals were agreements on "trade in civil aircraft", "government 
procurement", "dairy products" and "bovine meat". The last two were terminated in 
I 997. The plurilaterals on "trade in civil aircraft" and "government procurement" are still 
in force to date, and have been signed so far by 30 and 28 countries respectively. 
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The plurilateral devoted to "trade in civil aircraft" came into force on the of January 
I 980. It abolishes import duties on civil aircrafts, flight simulators, and their components, 
and regulates government procurement of those products. The plurilateral on "government 
procurement" came into force on the I St of January 1996 and replaces a previous agreement 
that dated from 1981. It aims at increasing foreign suppliers' access to public procurement 
through greater transparency, and at protecting them against discrimination. 
Morocco has been involved in no trade disputes so far within the WTO, neither as a 
complainant nor as a respondent. 
2.2. Object 
Member countries commit to two main obligations with respect to foreign trade. Those 
obligations are referred to as the "most-favored-nation" clause (henceforth MFN clause) 
and the "national treatment" clause. 
Put simply, the MFN principle implies that, under the WTO agreements, member countries 
cannot discriminate between their trading partners. More precisely, the MFN clause 
implies that any advantage granted by any contracting party to any product originating in 
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
the like product originating in, or destined for, the territories of all other contracting 
parties. Therefore, any concession, such as a lower duty on the imports of some product, 
granted to one partner should be automatically granted to all other WTO members. 
Morocco accords equal advantages to all its trade partners. 
All member countries must complement the MFN clause by the "national treatment" principle. 
This principle is found in the three main WTO agreements (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of 
GATS, and Article 3 of TRIPS). According to this second principle, imported and locally- 
produced goods should be treated equally, once the foreign goods have entered the market. 
The MFN principle is defined in the first article of the GATT. It also appears in the second 
article of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the fourth article of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), with 
slight differences. It is therefore a cornerstone 
The MFN principle, however, also suffers exceptions. In particular, regional trade agreements 
and special access to developing countries are allowed. Moreover in services, countries 
are allowed to discriminate, in limited circumstances. 
Regional trading arrangements are allowed as a special exception by GATT's Article 24. They 
must however meet specific criteria aiming at preventing those agreements from hurting other 
member countries. To this end, countries may only liberalise trade among themselves provided 
they do not raise barriers to trade with third parties. Moreover, the contracting countries 
3 
should aim at reducing barriers among themselves on all sectors of trade. 
The WTO agreements also grant developing and least-developed countries "special and 
differential treatment". Those special provisions of the agreement first take the form of 
exceptions to the MFN principle. Accordingly, a member country may grant developing 
partners some advantage without having to grant it to other countries. Moreover, 
negotiations between developed and developing countries may result in non-reciprocity 
of trade concessions (GATT's Part four). Developing countries are therefore not bound 
to grant trade concessions that correspond to those offered by their developed partners. 
Other special concessions are made to developing countries in the GATT, such as additional 
time to meet their commitments. 
2.3. Scope 
The scope of the WTO is defined in "The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations", signed by Ministers in Marrakech on the I 5th 
of April 1994. Broadly speaking, the scope of the organization is delineated by three main 
agreements, the GATT 1994 (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade), which deals with 
trade in goods, the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), devoted to trade 
in services, and the Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property 
rights), which deals with intellectual property rights that may impinge on trade. 
True to its name, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade's scope is universal. However 
a distinction is drawn between agricultural goods and other goods. For the latter, quotas 
are forbidden, whereas both tariffs and quotas are allowed for the former. Accordingly, 
the schedules of commitments made by individual member countries to complement the 
GATT consist of ceilings on customs tariff rates for non-agricultural products. After the 
Uruguay Round, 73% of developing countries' tariff lines were bound. 
For agricultural goods, those schedules consist of binding commitments on tariffs and quotas. 
However, the Marrakech Agreement initiated a process known as "tariffication" aiming at 
converting most trade restrictions into equivalent tariffs over the 1995-2000 period. 
Besides, non-tariff barriers are not directly addressed in the GATT, although specific 
agreements tend to regulate some of them. In particular, specific agreements are devoted 
to regulating import licensing, customs valuation procedures, preshipment inspections, 
rules of origin, and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), with the view of preventing 
them from being used for protection purposes. 
Like the GATT for goods, the coverage of the GATS in terms of service sectors is universal. 
Apart from government services and air traffic, which are both expressly excluded from 
the agreement's coverage, all services are covered by the GATS. 
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However, the liberalization commitments follow a positive list approach. Namely, the 
binding commitments that complement the GATS determine the conditions of market 
access and national treatment for foreign service-providers for specific sectors and modes 
of supply. They feature lists of types of services on which individual countries declare not 
to be applying the MFN principle and that wifi have to be liberalized. 
The present actual coverage of the GATS is therefore still limited. A new round was 
however launched in 2000 to increase its scope. 
The coverage of the TRIPS agreement is intellectual property in the fields of copyright 
and related rights, trademarks including service marks, geographical indications including 
appellations of origin, industrial designs, patents including the protection of new varieties 
of plants, the layout-designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information including 
trade secrets and test data. 
The TRIPS agreement came into force on the 1st of January 1995. However, member 
countries were given a transition period to comply with their obligations. The length of 
that transition period ranged from one year for developed countries to eleven years for 
least-developed countries. For other developing countries and countries in transition the 
transition period ended on the of January 2000. 
However, from the entry into force of the TRIPS agreement onward, the "non-backsliding" 
clause in Article 65.5, and the "mail-box" provision in Article 70.8 were to be respected 
by all member countries. These rules aimed at ensuring that the transition period could 
not result in a lower protection of intellectual property. The "non-backsliding" clause 
therefore prevents a country from taking advantage of the transition period to move its 
regulation away from its obligations as defined by the agreement. 
The "mail-box" clause obliges member countries to provide a way to fill patent applications 
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products during the transitional period, even 
though such patents do not exist yet in their domestic legal system. Those applications are 
to be subsequently examined when the country meets its commitment to provide a system 
of patents. If the application ends up successful, the product's patent protection will be 
granted for the remainder of the patent term, counted from the date of filing the application. 
2.4. Rules of origin 
Although the WTO does not determine specific rules of origin to be applied by its members, 
it provides for a process of harmonisation of those rules. In the context of the WTO, 
which is meant to be universal, the existence of such rules may appear surprising. In fact, 
those rules serve three purposes in the WTO legal framework. 
First, all countries of the world are not members of the organisation. Rules of origin 
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therefore allow determining which imports are covered by the MFN clause. Second, some 
countries, and mainly developing ones, are granted preferential treatment under the WTO. 
One must therefore be able to determine which products can be considered as originating 
in a developing country. Finally, as regional trade agreements are a specifically allowed 
exception to the general MFN rule, participating countries must be able to distinguish the 
goods that originate from the trade area. 
2.4. I. The absence of a definition of rules of origin in the WTO 
Like GATT did, WTO so far imposes no specific rules governing the determination of the 
country of origin of goods traded internationally. This means that each member of the 
organisation is free to determine its own rules of origin, and may even maintain several 
different such rules depending on the purpose of the particular regulation. 
More precisely, the choice of a rule of origin is left with the importer of the traded good 
in accordance with its law. This is in particular crucial in determining whether the most- 
favored nation clause should be applied. 
The most specific provision of the agreement is of an administrative nature. Thus, the 
Interpretative Note 2 to Article VIII: 1(c) of the General Agreement specifies that certificates 
of origin should only be required "to the extent that is strictly indispensable". The aim 
of this provision of the agreement was to minimise the incidence and complexity of import 
and export formalities as well as for documentation requirements. 
Although the agreement does not specify any rule of origin, it was agreed by all countries 
that harmonisation of rules of origin would ease international trade. The definition of rules 
of origin applicable to all countries, and independent from the purpose for which they 
were applied, was seen as desirable from the onset. An additional rationale for the 
harmonization of rules of origin was the concern that they may be used as a device to 
support a trade policy instrument. 
Due to the diversity of rules of origin, such harmonization is bound to be a difficult exercise. 
Although the GAIT Secretariat prepared a note on rules of origin as early as 1981, and Ministers 
agreed to study the rules of origin used by GAIT in November 1982, the first tangible step 
toward the coordination of those rules was not taken before the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
For the time being, no definitive harmonisation has been reached. However, the application 
of rules of origin has been governed by the "Agreement on Rules of Origin" signed in 1994 
under the auspices of the GATT and which is still in force today. 
2.4.2. A process of harmonisation 
The long-term aim of the agreement is the application of harmonised rules of origin among 
all WTO members, except in some kinds of preferential trade. For instance, countries 
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setting up a free trade area are allowed to use different rules of origin for products 
traded under their free trade agreement. However, the agreement should help to 
avoid that rules of origin create their own distortions and impediments to trade. 
The agreement established a harmonization work programme under the conduct of a 
Committee on Rules of Origin (CR0) in the WTO and a Technical Committee under the 
auspices of the World Customs Organization in Brussels. The outcome will be a single set 
of rules of origin to be applied under non-preferential trading conditions by all WTO 
members in all circumstances. The agreement set up a harmonization programme, to be 
initiated as soon as possible after the completion of the Uruguay Round and to be completed 
within three years of initiation. The programme was therefore initially due to end in July 
1998. However, several deadlines have been missed. 
The last rescheduling to date was decided by the General Council, at its meetings on the 
27th of July and the 1St of August 2004. It extended the deadline for completion of the 94 
core policy issues to July 2005. The General Council also resolved that after the resolution 
of these core policy issues, the CR0 would complete its remaining technical work by the 
31St of December 2005. 
In the mean time, the rules of origin of member countries should respect Part II of the 
agreement, which determines the obligations of member countries during the transition 
period. Rather than the definition of specific criteria, that part of the agreement lists a set 
of four general principles by which member countries should abide in the application of 
their rules of origin during the transition period. Namely: 
- Rules of origin should be transparent; 
- Rules of origin should not have restricting, distorting or disruptive effects on international 
trade; 
- Rules of origin should be administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial, and reasonable 
manner; 
- Rules of origin should be based on a positive standard (in other words, they should state 
what does confer origin rather than what does not). 
It is noteworthy that some developments that served to raise interest in rules of origin 
in the late I 980s are directly relevant to the purpose of the present report. Thus, an 
increased use of preferential trading arrangements, including regional arrangements, 
with their various rules of origin was making the recourse to rules of origin more 
complex. Moreover, an increased use of anti-dumping laws, led to claims of circumvention 
of anti-dumping duties through the use of third country facilities. 
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2.5. Present implementation and comments 
The objective of complying with the commitments it contracted under WTO led Morocco 
to greatly reform its institutional framework and its trade policy, be it at the national level 
or at the level of sectoral legislations. In this section, we therefore treat the main trade 
laws and more specifically, sectoral policies, separately. 
2.5. I. Main trade legislations 
The general trend of Morocco's trade policy is one of liberalization according to its WTO 
commitments. Morocco has therefore kept on reducing its external tariffs. Yet, the 
observed level of tariffs remains high and even seems to have increased over the late 90's. 
This is because, although ten tariff lines are subject to a zero rate, imports of certain types 
of cattle and their meat are subject to a 339 percent rate'. Moreover the average of MEN 
customs duties rose from 23.5 percent in 1995 to 33.4 percent in 2002 (WTO, 2003). 
However, this tendency is largely the result of several recent reforms of the Kingdom's 
trade policy that aim at abiding by its WTO commitments. The first such reform is the 
process of tariffication of quantitative restrictions. This process, which was completed in 
I 996, consisted of replacing the now forbidden quantitative restrictions on trade by 
equivalent tariff barriers. It sometimes resulted in sizeable tariff rates. 
Secondly, Morocco disaggregated its tariff lines from eight to ten digits. As the average 
tariff rate is computed as a simple arithmetic average of tariff lines, this modification 
contributed to the apparent rise in the average tariff. 
Finally, apparent tariffs were also raised by the inclusion of the fiscal levy on imports (PFI) 
into customs tariffs in 2000. This modification in the definition of customs tariffs was 
implemented for the sake of simplifying import duties. However, it resulted in a de jure 
rise in tariffs even though the de facto taxation of imports was kept constant or lowered. 
As a consequence, and despite Morocco's efforts to liberalize its external trade, more 
than one third of its tariff lines, that is 5,887 out of I 6,676 were subject to tariffs that 
exceeded the bound rates in 2003. However, had the fiscal import levy not been included 
in import duties, the number of lines subject to rates in excess of the bound rate would 
have amounted to 353. 
In addition to tariff rates that exceed bound rates, forty tariff lines are subject to variable 
tariff lines, which are nonetheless forbidden by WTO. 
Moreover, Morocco does not apply the tariff quotas to which it committed. Namely, 
countries' schedules of commitment included tariff quotas for imports that were already 
protected by a tariff. Those tariff quotas should not be confounded with quotas. A quota 
'The breakdown of MFN duties applied in 2002 is reported in Appendix 2. 
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restricts imports to a given Tariff rate quotas do not limit trade. On the contrary, 
they provide for imports at a favorable tariff up to a given quantity. Beyond these limits 
imports are unlimited. They are simply subject to higher tariffs. TRQs should be managed 
on a fully transparent basis and are handled either on a "first come first served" basis or 
on the basis of licenses or historic imports. Morocco committed to granting a reduced 
rate to a certain quantity of imports, on a MFN basis, and introduced tariff rate quotas 
on certain agricultural products for which imports were less than 5 percent of domestic 
consumption. The TRQs were established for meat, oilseed meals and fresh milk, but 
were not filled for some years due mainly to lack of market demand. The administration 
of TRQs is automatic as it is based on the first-come first-served method. 
It appears that Morocco's commitments are not respected insofar as all such products 
are subject to out-of-quota rates. 
In the Moroccan legal system international legal norms prevail over domestic laws. 
Accordingly, international treaties and agreements that are in contradiction with constitutional 
rules require constitutional amendments before ratification. 
This is why Morocco revised some of its trade-related laws in order to comply with its 
WTO commitments. The following laws were accordingly revised or enacted: 
- Law No. 13-89 on Foreign Trade was amended by Law No.3-96 (enacted on the I 2th 
of February I 997). It established the protection of agricultural commodities through 
tariff equivalents and the possibility of imposing safeguard measures to alleviate threats 
to the domestic production imposed by imported competitive goods to meet the terms 
of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Safeguards. 
- Dahir No. I -96-83 of the I St of August I 996 enacts Law No. I 5-95 containing the 
Commercial Code. It defines the status of trader and the associated obligations. It also 
provides for the declaration relating to entries in the commercial register, and disposes 
that they must specify the patents and trademarks owned by the trader. 
- Law No. 06-99 on Pricing Freedom and Competition, which came into effect on 6 July 
2001 and was implemented by Decree No.2-00-854 of the I 7th of September 200 I, 
replaces Law No.008-71, and was made possible by the 1996 revision of the constitution 
that established the freedom to do business. It is designed to guarantee the protection 
of consumers and a fair competition in economic relationships. 
- The Customs and Indirect Taxation Code has undergone several modifications. That 
Code, together with its implementing texts, regulates the competence of the Customs 
and Taxation Authority regarding imports and exports. It has for instance incorporated 
the provisions of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. It was further modified and 
complemented by Law No.02-99, enacted by Dahir No. 1-00-222 of the 5th of June. 
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Finally, it must also be mentioned that regulations have been adopted with the view of 
tackling corruption. For instance, cumulation of public positions has been forbidden. 
Furthermore, contacts between exporters and importers and customs officers have been 
limited thanks the simplification and the automation of declaration procedures. 
2.5.2. Main legislations dealing with intellectual property rights 
Morocco is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It has also 
ratified various international conventions. More recently, Morocco amended its intellectual 
property legislation by adopting three new laws on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
(Law No. New Plant Varieties (Law No. 9-94); and the Protection of 
Industrial Property3. 
The Moroccan Industrial and Commercial Property Office (OMPIC), which was created in 
2000 is in charge of enforcing industrial and commercial property legislation4 The Moroccan 
Copyright Office (BMDA) is in charge of implementing copyright and neighboring rights. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is in charge of protecting new plant varieties. 
Because the draft decree implementing the "Law No. I 7-97" has not yet been adopted, 
industrial property rights are still regulated by the "Dahir of the 23rd of June I 9 I 6", which 
provides exclusive rights for 20 years for patents, 20 years for trademarks (renewable 
indefinitely), and 25 years for industrial designs (renewable once). It offers national 
treatment to foreign suppliers. 
The Law No. I 7-9 7, which is not yet in force, provides a term of protection of 20 years 
for patents. Registration confers the ownership of a trademark (or service mark) for a term 
of ten years, renewable indefinitely. The holder of a trademark may lose his rights if he does 
not make a "proper" use of the mark for a continuous period of five years. The term of 
protection for a layout-design of an integrated circuit is ten years; the term for industrial 
designs is five years, renewable twice. The law No. I 7-97 prohibits the use of false or 
misleading indications of a product or service origin, identity of the producer, manufacturer 
or seller, and also punishes for use of false or misleading appellation of origin or its imitation. 
Any infringement of the industrial property legislation is subject to sanctions ranging from 
civil charges to penal sanctions. Customs officers may seize counterfeit goods but only 
on the basis of a judicial order requested by the right holder. Various violations of both 
industrial and intellectual property rights have been recorded in Morocco. These are 
mostly counterfeiting, piracy of musical and audiovisual tapes, industrial designs, and abuse 
2 
This Law has been in force since the 18th of November 2000.; 
Dahir No.1-00-91 of the 15th of February 2000 enacting Law No.17-97 on the protection of industrial property (3 January 2000). 
A draft implementing decree has been finalized. 
Dahir No.1-00-71 of the 15th of February 2000 enacting Law No.13-99 creating the Moroccan Industrial and Commercial Property 
Office, and Decree No.2-99-71 of the 9th of March 2000 on its implementation. 
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of trademarks. The extent to which the legal framework on property rights is effectively 
enforced is an issue in itself that goes beyond the scope of this report. 
The import and marketing of medicine require prior authorization from the National Drug 
Control Laboratory. Manufacturers must respect Good Manufacturing Practices (BPF) as 
ordered in the circular No. 36 on BFP release in July 1995 by the Minister of Health. 
The Moroccan legislation provides for a "research" or "experimental use" exception to allow 
researchers to use the patented invention for research. (Article 55. b, Law No I 7-97) 
Compulsory licenses can be granted by the government in order for a third party to produce 
a patented product or to use a patented process without consent of the patent holder. 
In the Moroccan law, Compulsory licenses may be requested three years after the issue 
of a patent, or four years after an application has been filed if the owner has not started 
to exploit his invention, or market its output, or has not worked or marketed the patent 
in Morocco for over three years. 
Ex officio licenses to work patents linked to the manufacture of medicine may be issued at 
the request of the public health authority, when necessary. This applies when the public 
health interest so requires, for example, when supplies of medicine on the Moroccan market 
are insufficient or when the quality of medicine is inadequate or prices are excessively high. 
Parallel imports, defined as importation of a patented or trademarked product from a country 
where it is marketed either by the right holder or with his consent, are not allowed in Morocco. 
As regards the application of the TRIPS agreement as such, Morocco, like other developing 
countries, benefited from the Article 65.2 and did not have to implement most of the TRIPS 
agreements until the I St of January 2000. That transition period allowed the Moroccan 
government to update and review its legislation in order to become consistent with TRIPS 
agreements. 
This legal framework in force in Morocco does not include pharmaceutical products for 
protection. It allows the Moroccan pharmaceutical industry to manufacture medicine by 
using "reverse engineering procedure"5 
On the basis of Provision 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, Morocco delayed patent protection 
for pharmaceutical products until January 2005 6 However, Morocco had to comply with 
(Article 70.8 a) generally called "mailbox provision". Inventors are allowed to file patent 
application from the 15t of January 1995, although the decision to grant them a patent or 
not need not be taken before expiration of the transition period. If the relevant 
On the basis of information on the chemical formula, local firms design a new manufacturing process. 
6 Under this provision, developing countries that did not provide product patent protection in a particular area of technology when 
the TRIPS agreement came into force (January 995) have up to 10 years to introduce this protection. 
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pharmaceutical product is allowed to be marketed during the transition period, the patent 
applicant must be given an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years (Article 
70.9), or until a decision on the patent is taken, whichever is shorter 
2.5.3. Sectoral policies 
In this section, we review Morocco's policy at the level of the sectors of activity. We 
accordingly review the agriculture and fisheries, mining and energy, manufacturing, and 
services sectors. We sketch each sector's main characteristics and underline the features 
of Morocco's economic policy in that sector that may be relevant to the assessment of 
its policy toward trade. 
Agriculture and fisheries 
The agriculture and fisheries sector plays a key role in Moroccan employment. It accounts 
for 22.9 percent of GDP and its share of the labor force amounts to 50 percent in the 
country. That share reaches 80 percent in rural areas. It also represents a sizeable source 
of exports earnings. 
The sector's main production is cereals, which are responsible for one third of its added value. 
Other products include sugar, oil seeds, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, livestock, and fish. 
Moroccan agriculture has to cope with several handicaps. Namely, around 90 percent of 
the cultivated land area is rain fed, which causes production to be uncertain and fluctuating 
over the years. Moreover, the size of farms is small. To wit 70 percent of farms are smaller 
than 5 ha. That situation may be the source of observed insufficient capital investments. 
Finally, the Moroccan exports in that sector are highly concentrated, both in terms of 
products and in geographical terms. Thus, exports mainly consist of horticultural products 
(mainly citrus fruit), fresh and canned vegetables (tomatoes, courgettes, and beans), and 
flowers, and the European Union absorbs 80 percent of the Kingdom's agricultural exports. 
In spite of its relative specialization in agriculture, Morocco is recognized in the WTO as 
a net food importer (wheat, oils, sugar, milk...). 
Overall, Morocco's policy in that sector has seen a trend of liberalization. Namely, almost all 
prices have now been liberalized and state monopolies dismantled. The remaining exceptions 
are flour, sugar, and tobacco whose prices remain controlled. Besides, imports of common 
wheat for the manufacture of domestic flour remains administered by a government body. 
In spite of its advantages in terms of cheap labor, proximity with Europe, and a climate 
that allows for the production of early fruits and vegetables, the agricultural sector remains 
fragile, because of droughts. Public policy in that sector therefore largely aims at developing 
irrigation where it is possible. 
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The objective of Morocco's support to agriculture has been to maintain a certain level of 
domestic production of basic foodstuffs and enlarge the potential for exports. As more 
than 40 percent of the population rely on agriculture, the food security issue should 
prevent the rural poor from migrating to the cities. 
The government has, however, progressively reduced its support to the sector since the 
early 80s (input subsidies eliminated, output prices liberalized). The remaining support 
is directed to public services to sustain agricultural development. 
Previously committed reforms and Structural Adjustment Plans have prevented Morocco 
from gaining sufficient flexibility in some of its domestic support commitments. 
The country bound its total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)7. and committed 
to reducing it by 13 percent over the period 1995-2004. From 1995 to 1997, the AMS 
was well below committed levels. The AMS consisted mainly of market price support 
forgone for supporting production and stockholding of cereals, mainly wheat. 
Total domestic support to agriculture increased due to higher "subsidies" in the green box 
and SDT categories (excluded from reduction commitments). They apparently provide 
sufficient flexibility for supporting different agricultural programs. 
Domestic food aid represented the major component of the green box measures (60 to 
80 percent of the total support). 
Investment subsidies for hydro-agricultural development represented, on average, more 
than 70 percent of the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) support. (extension of 
irrigation is seen as a priority by the government to reduce the drought impact). 
In the UR, Morocco did not notify having agricultural export subsidies for the base period, so 
no commitments in this area. However, the government provides support to reduce transportation 
and freight costs for exports, as permitted for developing countries under the AoA. 
As a contingency measure, a Prior Import Declaration (PID) system was initiated to protect 
some domestic sectors. Example, following a request by the banana industry, a PID was 
required in 1995 to avoid dumping in the domestic market. This PID is provisional, and 
future anti-dumping and countervailing actions will be in conformity with the WTO rules. 
As regards imports restrictions, the agricultural sector remains by far the most protected. 
The average tariff equals 40 percent and the tariff on selected live animals and meat even 
reaches 339 percent. The process of tariffication of quantitative restrictive measures 
largely accounts for those high rates. 
structure of domestic support is reported in Appendix 3 
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Moreover, agriculture is the only sector where Morocco applies variable tariffs. This is 
the case for a list of cereals and wheat. To limit the effects of those variable tariffs on 
poorer consumers, they are complemented by consumer subsidy and the prices of the 
products to which they apply remain regulated. 
On the other hand, although Morocco obtained the right to apply the safeguard special clause on 
374 lines of products of agriculture, that clause was only invoked for the imports of fresh bananas. 
The rest of Morocco's measures that may be a matter of protection consist of indirect 
protection of local producers through discriminatory legislations. For instance, the access 
of foreign investors to the acquisition of land is restricted. Special loans, favorable taxation, 
and subsidies are granted to local producers. For instance, the transport of fruits and 
vegetables is subsidized to compensate for transport costs. The fishing industry also 
remains closely controlled. Namely, deep-sea fishing companies are obliged to unload 
their catch in Morocco. They must also send their exports revenues back to Morocco. 
Mining and energy sector 
Mining accounts for 8 percent of Morocco's GDP and I 3% of its exports. The main 
Moroccan mining activity is the extraction of phosphate, which is sold either crude or 
transformed into fertilizer. The kingdom is also a producer of oil but its production remains 
marginal. Morocco is therefore an importer of oil. 
As regards the sector's regulation, the production of phosphate is controlled by a state 
monopoly. Firms from the mining sector are allowed to devote up to fifty percent of their 
profits to the constitution of a depletion allowance that is free of tax. 
Besides, consumption of petroleum products is subsidized. 
Manufacturing sector 
The manufacturing sector is responsible for one third of Morocco's GDP Its main subsectors 
are textiles, clothing, and the leather which accounts for I 7 percent of industrial GDP 
The other sizeable subsectors are the transport equipment industry and the pharmaceutical 
industry. One may notice that poultry farming is considered an industrial activity. 
A key feature of the textiles sector is the importance of subcontracting. It therefore 
benefits from a specific status that grants temporary entry whereby duties on imported 
intermediary inputs are eventually refunded when the final products are exported. In 
addition, the textiles sector benefits from a I 7 percent cut in the price of electricity. The 
extension of that status was part of an adjustment strategy designed to absorb the effects 
of increased competition in the sector. 
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Additional protection was also granted to the leather component of the textiles industry. 
Namely, due to the scarcity of hides and skins caused by epidemics, the Moroccan 
government implemented an export licence for skins and leather. That licence, which 
even applies to countries with which Morocco has signed a free trade agreement, was 
partly dismantled for some types of skins in 2002. 
On the other hand, tariffs on textiles products should decrease at an annual rate of 10 percent 
from 2003 until abolition, following the Association Agreement with the European Union. 
The automobile sector features an additional specificity of Morocco's trade regime following 
an agreement between the Moroccan government and Fiat Auto SpA. That agreement 
exempts the firm from import duties on the CKD series, as well as on some inputs. Fiat 
also granted a reduction in VAT on the sales of economy vehicles and some inputs. On 
the flip side, the firm is subject to a local content constraint. The local content ratio was 
gradually raised to reach 50 percent since 1998. 
The last noteworthy trade policy concerns the pharmaceutical industry. The local 
pharmaceutical industry meets 70 percent of local demand for medicine. However, it 
relies heavily on imports of active ingredients, and semi-finished products. The ten leading 
laboratories, among 26 in the industry, account for 75 percent of the market. The 
pharmaceutical industry in Morocco developed under trade protection and thanks to 
partnerships created in the sixties between national pharmacists and multinationals. The 
legal framework, which goes back to 19 February 1960, appears now to be constraining. 
Two provisions are generally indicated by professionals. The first, is the statutory requirement 
that imposes on each company to have its own plant, which limits the potential for sectoral 
concentration in Morocco unlike the global trend in pharmaceutical industry. The second, 
is the fact that 5 I percent of the capital of pharmaceutical firms must belong to pharmacists 
(natural persons), and 26 percent must be owned by pharmacists authorized to practice 
in Morocco (either Moroccans or foreigners)8. Professionals consider that these provisions 
limit investment levels in the sector, and prevent firms from benefiting from economies 
of scale. A draft law liberalizing capital in pharmaceutical firms is in the process of adoption. 
Generic medicine appeared on the Moroccan market a decade ago. Currently roughly 30 
millions units are sold on the local market, which is the equivalent of 16 percent of total 
consumption. Hospitals represent the largest buyers of generic medicine in Morocco. In 
the future, generics are expected to capture a higher share of the domestic market. 
The debate on TRIPS in Morocco seems to be focusing on the pharmaceutical industry. 
Access to medicine is already limited by an insufficient coverage of the health insurance, 
8 
Dahir No. 1-59-367 of the 9th of February I 960 containing the regulations for practising as physicians, pharmacists, dental surgeons, 
herbalists, or midwives. 
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especially among the poor. Most financing of private care is made by out-of-pocket money 
rather than heafth insurance. The cost of medicine is already considered as expensive 
even though many of these medicines are not patented. 
The debate is very much skewed towards the implications of TRIPS on domestic 
pharmaceutical industry rather than the implications on consumers. Local organizations 
of consumers are still weak, and lack both legal means and financial resources to exert 
any significant impact on the public debate or on the public-policy making process. 
The ministry of health's involvement in this issue seems to be limited to the National Drug 
Control Laboratory, which is more a technical than a policy-oriented department. There 
is a lack of a clear and coherent national drug policy for the moment. 
An intensive debate on potential negative implications on the pharmaceutical industry and 
the access to drugs emerged when the Moroccan government was negotiating the free 
trade agreement with the US. However, pressures to close negotiations and sign the 
agreement brought the debate to a halt. 
Some groups of consumers expressed their strong objection to the agreement signed by 
the Moroccan authorities with the US. They believe that Morocco accepted the conditions 
imposed by US pharmaceutical companies. These conditions are more constraining than 
what is allowed under WTO-TRIPS. 
Services sector 
Overall services provide 60 percent of Morocco's GDP The main subsectors of the services 
sector are trade, tourism, telecommunications, transport, and financial services. Those 
sectors now come under the jurisdiction of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
of the WTO. However, their position with regard to that agreement is mixed. 
Namely, except for specific activities, Morocco has not bound the measures that restrict 
the presence of physical persons. Moreover, the Kingdom reserved the right to maintain 
specific regulations under the GATS. This is for instance the case in the financial sector, 
where Morocco is still allowed to limit foreign participation in the capital of large banking 
institutions. In the tourism sector, Morocco also obtained that foreign travel agencies 
established abroad have to operate in the country through local agencies. Moreover, only 
Moroccan nationals may work as tourguides. A similar obligation is imposed on insurers, 
who are obliged to keep a head office within Moroccan borders. 
Morocco also intervenes in the transport and tourism sectors thanks to various tax 
exemptions and subsidies. 
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3. Greater Arab free trade area 
3.1. Date of entry into force and membership 
On the I 9th of February 1997, the Arab Economic Union, which had been created in 1957 
by the League of Arab States, decided to establish "a Pan-Arab Free Trade Area [AFTA] 
over ten years as of the 1st of January 1998", namely by 2008 (Article I of the Executive 
Programme). That decision was an effort to revive the 1981 Agreement for Facilitation 
and Promotion of Trade, thanks to the addition of an Executive Programme. Accordingly 
all the members of the League, with the exception of Algeria, Djibouti, Comoros, and 
Mauritania, agreed to lower their tariffs from 1998. 
Among those member states, some decided to take part in the Greater Arab Free Trade 
Area (GAFTA). These aim at abolishing duties on manufactured goods by 2005 and to 
progressively free trade of agricultural products by 2008. 
As of the 1st of January 1998, the contracting parties were Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, 
United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, 
Oman, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
3.2. Object 
The program's main aim is a reduction of tariffs on imported products over a ten year 
period. Although Article 2 of the Agreement creating AFTA mentions concessions to 
services associated with trade, no tangible step seems to have been taken in that direction. 
The agreed upon rate of reduction is 10 percent per year. Tariffs should therefore have 
been abolished by the end of 2007. Member states moreover agreed to bind their national 
tariffs at their December 31 St I 997 levels. Moreover, tariff-like charges and taxes should 
be treated as tariffs. 
The program also calls for a schedule to suppress non-tariff barriers (Article 3 of the 
Executive Programme), but those barriers have not yet been subject to negotiation. 
However, a committee on non-tariff barriers has been set up to determine the goods 
whose non-tariff barriers should be negotiated. 
The agreement provides for the possibility of exceptions to the general reduction of tariffs. 
Member states are therefore allowed to write a list of industrial products that may benefit 
from exemptions from tariff reductions during the first years of the program. This provision 
seeks to allow local industries to restructure and adapt to the competition of other member 
countries' imports. Article 15 of the agreement moreover specifies that the Council should 
approve the length of the period of time during which those exemptions may last. 
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The program allows members to suspend tariff reductions on some agricultural products 
during harvest seasons, which may not last more than seven months. Member countries 
are authorized to submit up to ten agricultural items for suspension. The maximum total 
exemption for all those items is forty-five months. All exemptions should have disappeared 
by the end of the transition period 
Finally, it is explicitly specified in Article 3 of the agreement that the principle agreed upon 
constitutes "the minimum level of trade cooperation among the party-states". Each party- 
state is therefore entitled to conclude either bilateral or multilateral agreements with any 
other Arab state or states. However, Article 7.5 of the Agreement specifies that "no 
party-state may grant any preferential advantages to a non-Arab state that 
exceeds those granted to party-states". 
On the other hand, a special treatment can be granted to the less developed Arab countries 
as defined by the United Nations' classification, plus Palestine. 
3.3. Scope 
The scope of the process of liberalisation is specified in Article 2. I of the Executive 
Programme, which stipulates that "all Arab goods traded among the party-states shall be 
liberalized in accordance with the gradual liberalization principle". 
A few exceptions are however allowed by the Programme. Those exemptions are given 
in two distinct lists of goods. 
First, Article 2.2 of the Programme states that agricultural goods specified by each country 
may benefit from a temporary protection during their "production season (Farmer's 
Almanac)". Each member country may determine the list of agricultural goods they wish 
to include in the Farmer's Almanac, under the supervision of the Economic and Social 
Council. However, no such list may feature more than ten goods. 
As regards Morocco, the list of agricultural products concerned is spelled out in "circulaire 
noo 4899/223 du 26/12/2003". 
Second, Article 2.4 of the Programme excludes of the process of trade liberalisation those 
"products and materials whose import, trading or use in any of the states is banned for religious, 
health, security, or environmental reasons or because of agricultural and veterinary quarantine 
rules". Each member country is therefore requested to submit a list of such products. 
The relevant list of prohibited goods for Morocco can be found in "circulaire noo 4821/223 
du 11/10/2002". 
The committee on non-tariff barriers has spelled out a list of goods whose imports are 
banned for religious, health, environment, and national security reasons. That list is to be 
reviewed every year. 
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Finally, some Moroccan products exported to Egypt and Syria that can be found on preset 
lists are also exempt from tariff reduction. Those goods are listed in "circulaire noo 
4650/223 du 30/08/2000". 
Although party states should consult over services, GAFTA does not provide for free trade 
in services nor right of establishment. However, ongoing negotiations are aimed at drafting 
an Arab Agreement on Free Trade in Services. 
3.4. Rules of origin 
The criteria determining whether an import is eligible for preferential trade under the 
GAFTA are twofold. Not only should that import originate from a member country, but 
it should also it be imported from its country of origin either directly or via other member 
countries. As Article I 7 of the agreement specifies "goods shall be traded among party- 
states directly and without mediation of a non-Arab party." 
To be considered to originate from an Arab country, a product should fulfil the conditions 
provided for in Article 9. It should accordingly either be entirely produced in a member 
country, or have undergone a sufficient transformation in a member country. 
Sufficient transformation is understood to imply that the value added to a good as a result 
of its production in a member country is no less than forty percent of its value when 
finished. For assembly industry, the percentage of value added in a member state is brought 
down to twenty percent. 
That ratio of foreign to domestic content can be computed thanks to two methods, either 
the local value added approach or the net cost approach. The latter subtracts specified 
imported expenses from the transaction price to determine the denominator of the ratio. 
Moreover, the agreement allows "full cumulation of origin" among the GAFTA members. 
According to that principle, materials obtained from a member country, and incorporated 
into a product made in another member country, may be considered as if they were 
obtained entirely in the second country. 
Finally, the program also underlines the necessity to harmonise rules of origin with the 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreements. 
It must, however, be stressed that the precise Protocol on detailed rules of origin has not 
been agreed upon so far. 
Duty drawback is prohibited, as non-originating materials used in the manufacture of 
products originating in the Arab member states shall not be subject to drawback or 
exemption from customs duties in any of the Arab member countries. 
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Moreover, the provisions concerning this prohibition of drawback shall not apply during the 
transitional period for establishing the GAFTA. (Art. 14 of the Protocol on Rules of Origin). 
3.5. Present ilmplementation and comments 
GAFTA's legal framework is provided by the Agreement for Facilitation and Promotion 
of Trade that was signed on the of February 1981, with the adjunction of the Executive 
Programme. It came into force on the of January 1998. 
The schedule consists of a 10% annual reduction in the tariffs applied on the I St of January 
1998. The complete suppression of tariffs on goods exchanged within the area should 
therefore be reached on the 3 of December 2007. 
In addition to duties, the program calls for a reduction of non-tariff barriers. However, 
these barriers have not been tackled so far. A committee on non-tariff barriers has been 
set up to start negotiations for their elimination. For the time being, its role has been to 
determine a list of goods whose imports are prohibited for religious, health, environmental, 
and national security reasons, that is to be reviewed every year. 
4. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The EU is a crucial partner for Morocco, as its market accounts for more than 80 percent of 
the Kingdom's agricultural exports (around 90 percent for tomatoes, 80 percent of oranges). 
A specificity of trade between the two entities is that, during the implementation period 
of the Uruguay Round, Morocco's access to the EU fruits and vegetables market is governed 
by the Entry Price System as well as by the bilateral agreement. 
4.1. Date of entry into force and membership 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Process encompasses a host of 
dimensions pertaining to political, economic, and social relations between the Member 
States of the European Union and their Partners of the Southern Mediterranean. The 
establishment of a free-trade area, to which the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration 
is devoted, is but one of those dimensions. 
Moreover, the Barcelona Process is not meant to be applied immediately. On the contrary, 
it provides the basis for complementary negotiations of bilateral agreements between the 
EU and each of its partners. In the field of trade, the Barcelona Agreement provides that 
the EU negotiates Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with each of its 
Mediterranean Partners to replace the I 970s Cooperation Agreements. Broadly speaking, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area foresees free trade in manufactured goods, the 
progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural products, and eventually the liberalization 
of trade in services and capital, although the GATS remains the basis for trade in services.. 
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In addition to bilateral trade agreements with Europe, the Mediterranean Partners are 
committed to implement free trade among themselves, through South-South negotiations. 
The Agadir initiative, to which the next section is devoted, is the result of such South- 
South negotiation. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Process, was launched at the Euro- 
Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on the 27th 
and 28th of November 1995. 
The specific agreement between the EU and Morocco was signed in Brussels on the 26th 
of February 1996. It came into force on the 1St of March 2000. It provides for the gradual 
establishment of an industrial free-trade area by 2012 and progressive liberalization of 
trade in agriculture. It reinforces the arrangements for free trade in industrial products, 
dating from the late I 970s. 
Since the latest EU enlargement, which occurred on the 1St of May 2004, the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership comprises 35 members, that is to say 25 EU Member States 
and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). 
With the future enlargements of the EU, the number of countries involved in the partnership 
may eventually increase to up to forty. Moreover, Libya has observer status since 1999. 
4.2. Object 
The ultimate objective set by the Barcelona Declaration is to create a Euro-Mediterranean 
Free-Trade Area (EFTA) between the members of the EU and their Mediterranean Partners. 
As the EU negotiates Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with each of its 
Mediterranean Partners, the provisions of those agreements may differ from one 
Mediterranean Partner to the other. They however share some broad features. 
In particular, as regards trade, the European Union requires all its partners to adopt its 
competition policy rules, and all agreements provide for the elimination of non-tariff- 
barriers and antidumping rules. Accordingly, any State subsidy which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition is incompatible with the Agreement9. All agreements also feature 
the right to implement safeguard mechanisms in case of balance of payments difficulties 
or increased imports for both parties. However, Mediterranean countries are offered the 
possibility to take non-reciprocal safeguard measures to protect their infant industries. 
For a period of five years as of the date of entry into force of the Agreement, Morocco is allowed to subsidise the restructuring of 
the steel industry. 
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4.3. Scope 
The agreement's general principle is the abolition of duties and charges of equivalent effect 
applicable on imports into Morocco of products originating in the EU (Article I I of the 
agreement with Morocco) and vice versa (Article 9 of the agreement with Morocco). 
As regards services, the agreement simply reaffirms the principles of the GATS (Articles 
31 . I and 31 .2 of the agreement with Morocco), which is widened to include the right of 
establishment and the provision of services to customers (Article 32 of the agreement 
with Morocco). 
In principle, all products that appear in Chapters I to 97 of the Harmonized system are 
covered. As for Morocco, this disposition chiefly applies to three types of goods defined 
in the agreement. 
The first class consists of manufactured goods imported from the EU by Morocco. 
Regarding those goods, Morocco's dismantling of tariffs distinguishes the products that 
are exempt from trade restrictions upon the date the Agreement entered into force; 
products for which tariffs will be phased out over three years as of the entry into force 
of the Agreement at an annual rate of 25 percent; and products for which tariffs will be 
phased out at an annual rate of 10 percent over 12 years, with a three-year grace period, 
at an annual rate of 10 percent. (WTO Report) 
The second class is a list of processed agricultural products originating in the EU and 
imported by Morocco. The industrial component of duties on those products should be 
dismantled at an annual rate of 25 percent upon entry into force of the Agreement for a 
first list of products; and at an annual rate of 10 percent for a second list of products, 
three years after entry into force of the Agreement. (WTO Report). 
The third class consists of agricultural imports from the EU, which are subject to preferential 
tariff quotas. I 25 tariff lines are accordingly subject to lower customs duties. Moreover, 
MFN tariff rates apply to crustaceans and molluscs originating in the EU. 
Exceptions however exist. A set of used goods, defined in "circulaire de base noo46 17/222" 
published on the I 5th of February 2000 and updated is excluded from the list of manufactured 
goods. Duties defined in the common law are accordingly applied to those goods. 
The EU commits to importing products originating in Morocco free of customs duties (Article 
9). Article 7 however states that products referred to in Annex I to the treaty establishing 
the European Community (broadly speaking, agricultural products, are exceptions to the 
general principle. However, an agricultural component may be retained on imports by the 
EU of products that incorporate agricultural products. (Moroccan customs) 
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4.4. Rules of origin 
The criterion determining whether an import is eligible for preferential trade under the 
agreement is twofold. That import should originate from a partner country but also be 
imported directly from its country of origin. 
To be considered to originate from a partner a product should either be entirely 
produced in that member country, or have undergone a sufficient transformation in that 
member country. Those products that may be considered to have been entirely produced 
in a member country are mineral ores collected on that country's territory, agricultural 
products harvested in a that animals born or raised in that country, products from 
the sea fished and transformed on that country's ships, used goods that may only serve 
as material for recycling, and any product produced from the aforementioned products. 
In the agreement, sufficient transformation is here defined according to a "process 
criterion". Namely, a sufficient transformation is as a transformation that results in a change 
of classification in the Harmonized System with respect to the materials used for production. 
This general principle is complemented by a list of transformations that give the transformed 
product an origin corresponding to the country of transformation (see Document 2 of 
circulaire 461 7/222 of 15/02/2000). For a last set of exceptions (Chapters 84 to 91 of the 
circulaire), the origin can be chosen by the exporter. 
Finally, cumulation of origins is allowed between contracting countries, namely Morocco 
and EU members. It is also theoretically allowed with products originating from Tunisia 
and Algeria. However, the implementation of this provision requires rules of origin to be 
consistent between the participating countries. This is however not the case, since sufficient 
transformation is defined thanks to a percentage criterion (namely a forty percent added 
value in a member country) for trade between Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. 
It is noteworthy that this rule of origin is a provision of GAFTA, in which Tunisia 
and Morocco participate. This results in a conflict between the two agreements 
to which Morocco is part. 
4.5. Present implementation and comments 
The schedule of implementation of the agreement differs between manufactured and 
agricultural goods. 
For Moroccan exports, the Agreement provides for exemption from customs duties with 
or without quota limits; exemption from customs duties subject to reference quantities 
or agreed reduced entry prices within quota limits; and exemptions from customs duties 
not subject to quota limits. For EU agricultural products, Morocco's concessions are duty 
reductions within quota limits ("octroi de preferences au titre du droit d'importation dans 
le cadre de contingents" cf. liste noo8 de l'annexe I de Ia circulaire de base). 
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The Agreement contains an appointment clause to provide for more extensive liberalization 
in agricultural trade. These negotiations are under way. 
As regards manufactured goods, the Agreement provides for free access for Moroccan 
industrial products in exchange for the phased dismantling, over a period of I 2 years, of 
duties on EU products, according to lists drawn up on the basis of product sensitivity. 
The way to free trade is marked by two successive stages. Thus, as soon as the agreement 
comes into force (on the of March 2000), imports on equipment goods and spare parts 
should be free of import duty. 
The import duty on raw materials and intermediary goods should be cut down by twenty- 
five percent each year (List I Annex I of circulaire de base noo46 I 7/222 of the I 5th of 
February 2000). This measure also applies to the industrial component of transformed 
agricultural products. 
Finally, reference prices applied on products listed in circulaire noo4546/4 I 3 of 5 October 
1998 should be either eliminated or cut down by twenty-five percent. 
The second stage starts on the 1st of March 2003, that is, on the fourth year of the 
application of the agreement. On that day, the import duty on locally produced goods 
should decrease by ten percent each year. Additionally, the dismantling of the import duty 
on a list of vehicles should also start, at a pace of three percent each year for four years, 
then by fifteen percent per year, until complete suppression. 
Regardless of the general objective of reducing protection, Article 14 allows "exceptional 
measures of limited duration 0 in the form of an increase or reintroduction of customs 
duties", should an industry be facing "serious difficulties, particularly where these difficulties 
produce major social problems". That article however specifies that "these measures may 
not exceed 25% ad valorem and shall maintain an element of preference for products 
originating in the community". 
It should also be noted that for agro-industrial products, the agricultural component should 
be separated from the industrial component, the latter being phased out. 
As regards exports from Morocco to the EU, the reduction in protection started on the 
entry into force of the agreement. 
Finally, the Agreement specifies that the EU and Morocco shall gradually liberalize a greater 
share of their trade in agricultural and fisheries products. With this end in view, additional 
negotiations began on the 23Id of January 2002. Respective offers of concessions were 
subsequently submitted on the 18th of June 2002. (WTO Report) 
The association agreement signed between the EU and Morocco in February 1996 
postponed negotiations on the agricultural component of the partnership between the 
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two parties until January 2000. Due to the delay in the ratification of the agreement it did 
not enter into effect until March 2000, and it was not until the beginning of 2002 that the 
negotiations on agriculture actually opened. 
The main requests of the two parties in the negotiations are the following: 
The EU insists that Morocco must open its market to European products under preferential 
conditions and in substantial proportions. Its position rests on the principle of reciprocity, 
which must form the basis of the liberalization of trade between Morocco and the EU. 
The Moroccan negotiators consider that the first step must be to assess the experience 
gained from the current agreement in two key aspects: 
The first question concerns the difference in interpretation of the provision of the association 
agreement on the mutually agreed entry price quota for tomatoes. The Moroccan party 
considers that the quota that has been indicated for this product concerns only the quantities 
that are marketed at the preferential entry price but that the quantities that can enter the 
market at the WTO entry price must not be counted in the quota in question. The EU 
contests this approach considering that the quota indicated is the single valid quota which 
must not be exceeded irrespective of the market access conditions in which it is realized. 
The second question concerns some Moroccan products which were more or less 
"omitted" in the previous negotiations and whose access to European market has thus 
been placed at a disadvantage even compared to the conditions they enjoyed before the 
1995 agreement (gherkins, dehydrated vegetables, concentrated tomatoesO). 
Morocco considers that once these two issues have been settled, the two parties can 
open negotiations. 
The reduction of MEN tariff rates agreed on in the framework of the Uruguay Round 
agricultural agreement inevitably eroded the rate of preference which Morocco and various 
other EU trade partners have been enjoying. 
5. Quadripartite and Agadir agreements 
The Agadir Agreement was formally signed on the 25th of February 2003 by Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan in the city of Rabat, although it was introduced in May 200 I 
in Agadir, hence its name. The participating states expressed their intention to set up a 
Free Trade Area among themselves. 
The scope of the agreement includes customs, services, certificates of origin, government 
purchases, financial dealings, preventive measures, intellectual property, standards and 
specifications, dumping and mechanisms to resolve conflicts. 
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The agreement was supervised by the EU and is related to EMFTA. It is open to new 
partner countries and therefore stipulates that "any Arab country, member of the Arab 
League and the Arab Free Trade Zone and linked to the EU through an Association or 
Free Trade Agreement can adhere to the Agadir Agreement, after the consent of the 
member countries, at the level of the Foreign Ministers Committee". 
Prior to the signature of the Agadir Agreement, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia had 
signed a quadripartite free-trade agreement on the I I th of January 2003. That agreement 
calls for the progressive dismantling of customs duties on industrial products, with a view 
of reaching complete suppression on the 1st of January 2006. By that date, duties should 
have been cut down by 65 percent on the date of signature, 80 percent by the 1st of 
January 2004, and 90 percent by the 1St of January 2005. 
Besides, trade policy on agricultural products should follow the scheme laid down by the 
Arab League. 
6. Other agreements 
6.1. General system of preferences 
The General System of Preferences was designed as an exception to the MFN clause 
implied by the GATT, with the aim of fostering the development of developing countries 
via trade. It was adopted at UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968. It was originally introduced 
as a ten year transient waiver to Article I of the GATT, and subsequently perpetuated on 
the 28th of November 1979. 
Under that scheme, products originating in developing countries are granted reduced or 
zero tariff rates over the MFN rates, on a non-reciprocal basis. Each preference-giving 
country drafts its own GSP schemes. Partial or full exemption of duties is granted by 
preference-giving countries, according to their schemes. Rules of origin are also defined 
by preference giving countries. 
As of June 200 I, Morocco was given preference under the GSP by the European Community 
and the following countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, and the United-States. 
The products that come under the scope of the GSP are the following: manufactured 
goods, semi-finished goods, certain agricultural products including products of fisheries, 
and certain handcrafted goods. 
6.2. Maghreb Arab Union 
The Maghreb Arab Union was created in Marrakech on the I 7th of February 1989, between 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia. 
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Although its aim is broad, encompassing a common unit of account and even a process 
of political integration, the MAU's objectives remain mainly trade oriented in the short 
term. It therefore targets the free movement of goods and persons and a revision of 
customs regulations. 
To this end, it has set up a ten-member court to settle disputes between parties originating 
in member countries. It has also instituted the Maghreb Advisory Body that consists of 
an assembly of fifty members of parliament. 
6.3. Bilateral agreements with Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia 
Previous to the conclusion of the Agadir Agreement and the quadripartite agreement, 
Morocco had signed bilateral free trade agreements with Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. 
The agreement with Egypt had been concluded on the of May 1998, and entered into 
force on the of April 1999. The agreement with Jordan had been signed on the I 6th 
of June 1998 and entered into force on the 21st of October 1999. Finally, the agreement 
with Tunisia was signed and came into force on the I 6th of March 1999. 
One may also note that another agreement was also signed with the United Arab Emirates 
on the 25th of June 2001, but it has not come into force yet. 
The scopes of the agreements are similar. They provide for the establishment of a free- 
trade area within I 2 years for all products, but the dismantling process is postponed for 
agricultural products, unless they are already exempt from duty. 
A few additional exemptions are also included in the agreements. More precisely, the 
agreements with Egypt and Jordan do not cover products originating in one of the countries' 
free zones, nor agricultural products listed in chapters I to 24 of the harmonized system. 
Negative lists complement those exemptions. 
The agreement with Tunisia sets up three lists of Moroccan exports and four lists of 
Tunisian exports to which the agreement applies. A negative list is also included in the 
agreement. 
Depending on the type of product considered, the exemptions of duties will take place 
either immediately or according to a preset scheme. However, total dismantling of duties 
on concerned products should occur no later than ten years after the agreements' coming 
into force. 
The rules of origin foreseen in the three agreements are similar. They rest on the forty 
percent criterion, in addition to considering that all products obtained entirely on one of 
the signatories' territory originates in that country. 
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6.4. Other regional and multilateral agreements 
In addition to the agreements listed above, Morocco has concluded other regional 
agreements of lesser importance that are listed below. 
6.4. I. Morocco-EFTA free trade agreement 
EFTA is an agreement between Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The 
Morocco-EFTA free trade agreement was signed on the of June 1997 and entered 
into force on the 1St of March 2000. 
That agreement covers industrial products listed in Chapters 25 to 97 of the Harmonized 
System, fish and other marine products listed in Chapters 3, 15 and 23 of the Harmonized 
System, and processed agricultural products defined in Protocol A. 
The agreement provides for the exemption from customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect for products originating in Morocco, as from the date of the Agreement's entry into 
force. In return, tariffs, on EFTA-originating industrial products should be dismantled starting 
on the date of the Agreement's entry into force and over a period of 12 years (phasing out 
according to the scheme laid down for EU-originating industrial products). 
The agricultural component of the agreement consists of bilateral arrangements between 
contracting parties. For agro-industrial products, it is planned to separate the agricultural 
and industrial components. 
Morocco may keep some protection but implement no new one. 
Fisheries are granted a specific treatment under the agreement. Morocco benefits from 
total exemption of trade restrictions on most exports. For EFTA, a list of products exempt 
from customs duties and charges having equivalent effect as from the date of the Agreement's 
entry into force was set. It was complemented by lists of products to be progressively 
liberalized over a period of four, six, and nine years. 
The definition of a product's origin rests on the process criterion. Moreover bilateral 
cumulation of origin between parties is allowed. 
6.4.2. Trade preference system among Islamic countries 
The Trade Preference System among Islamic countries entered into force in 2003. Its 
members are the 56 members of the Organization of the Islamic conference. 
6.4.3. Global system of trade preferences 
The Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries was 
established in I 988 as a framework for reciprocal trade preferences among developing countries. 
28 
Membership in the GSTP is limited to members of the Group of 77 and China. For the 
time being, the system has 43 member countries (Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Tanzania, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe). 
The GSTP is based on the principle of mutuality of advantages but recognizes the specificity 
of LDCs. It therefore allows preferential measures in their favor. 
The GSTP must be renegotiated on a periodic basis. However, member countries must 
bind their tariff preferences. 
6.4.4. Community of Sahel and Saharan states 
CEN-SAD was established on the 4th of February 1998. Besides Morocco, CEN-SAD 
includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Central Africa, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Libya, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia. Other countries are in 
the process of joining the Organization. 
CEN-SAD's scope is very broad. Among others, it aims at liberalising trade among the 
contracting countries, as well as movements of persons and capital among Member States. 
6.5. Other bilateral and unilateral agreements 
Morocco's trade policy is complemented by a set of bilateral and unilateral trade agreements. 
It has thus signed bilateral agreements with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Republic of Guinea, 
and Saudi Arabia. Bilateral agreements with Chad and the Republic of Guinea have also 
been signed but are not in force yet. 
Furthermore, Morocco has signed a set of trade agreements extending the MEN clause 
to countries that are not members of the WTO. Morocco's partners in those agreements 
are the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Iran, the Russian 
Federation, Seychelles, Sudan, and Yemen. 
Finally, Morocco has also signed a unilateral trade and tariff agreement with Senegal, which 
it unilaterally applies while awaiting an agreement with the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
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Part 2: Compliance of Morocco's trade policy with its 
commitments 
Overall, Morocco's nexus of multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements is a signal of 
its commitment to liberalising trade. Nevertheless the superposition of agreements of 
various types and various scopes may in itself create difficulties in the management of 
Morocco's trading system. In particular, Morocco may have committed to policies that 
are contradictory or mutually defeating. 
In what follows, some such areas where Morocco's trade policy conflicts with its 
commitments or prevents it from making the most of its trading potential are emphasized. 
I. Some applied rates remain higher than the bound rate 
In its assessment of Morocco's trade policy, the WTO Secretariat notes that 5887 tariff 
lines, equivalent to one third of Morocco's tariff lines, still exceed the bound rate. 
A possible explanation to this phenomenon is that Morocco has replaced its quantitative 
measures by tariff measures of equivalent effect, which resulted in a surge in applied 
duties. Moreover, the fiscal levy on imports was included into customs tariffs in 2000, 
which also caused declared tariffs to rise. 
2. Some subsidies may not be in accordance with 
Morocco's commitments 
Morocco still subsidizes both the production and consumption of some goods, which are 
considered socially vulnerable. Although those subsidies tend to be eliminated, they may 
not only clash with Morocco's multilateral commitments, but also be mutually defeating. 
The cereals subsector provides an example of such a seemingly inconsistent policy. Thus, 
ad valorem tariff rates of up to 53.5 percent are levied on products such as durum wheat 
for sowing, common wheat for sowing, and other cereals, so as to protect that subsector. 
Moreover, variable duties are also applied to products such as durum wheat, common 
wheat, barley, maize, rice, and sorghum. 
On the other hand, in order to compensate the impact of that policy, a consumer subsidy 
is also granted for domestic flour made of common wheat intended for the underprivileged 
sectors of the population. 
One may accordingly conclude that the elimination of the abovementioned production 
subsidies would allow a reduction in consumption prices that may make the consumption 
subsidy either unnecessary or more efficient. 
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3. The application of variable tariff lines is incompatible 
with WTO 
The last trade policy report by the WTO Secretariat detects forty tariff lines that are 
subject to variable tariffs, which are explicitly ruled out by WTO. Those tariffs are functions 
of the product's import price and of a minimum threshold price. Two types of such tariffs 
exist in Morocco. 
A first type of variable tariff consists of two different rates. A high rate is applied when 
the declared value of the product under consideration is lower than a minimum threshold. 
A lower rate applies when the product's declared value exceeds that minimum threshold 
price. Such variable tariffs are for instance applied to agricultural products such as wheat, 
rice, soyabeans, colza, rape and sunflower seed, or sugar. 
A second type of variable tariff results from the adjunction of a fixed and a variable rate. 
More to the point, the rate applicable to some products is constant when those products' 
declared value is equal to or greater than a fixed threshold, and a function of the product's 
declared value when that value is smaller than the threshold. Under those circumstances, 
the variable rate rises from the constant rate to a possibly infinite value when the declared 
value decreases. Such variable tariffs are for instance applied to durum wheat other than 
seed for sowing or common wheat other than seed for sowing. 
4. Specific measures awarded to specific firms 
Some tariff reduction or exemptions have been negotiated directly between specific firms 
and the Moroccan government. One may wonder whether those derogative agreements 
are consistent with Morocco's various commitments. 
For instance, the Moroccan Government and Fiat Auto SpA signed an agreement whereby 
Fiat Auto Maroc is exempt from import duties on the CKD series, and raw materials and 
inputs needed to manufacture economy vehicles, as well as a VAT reduction of 7 percent 
on sales of economy vehicles in Morocco, on integrated local components and the raw 
materials and inputs needed for their manufacture. Under that agreement Fiat produces 
private vehicles in the plants of the Moroccan Automobile Construction Company 
(SOMACA) until 30 June 2003. 
5. Safeguard measures 
Morocco applies specific protection measures when imports threaten to hurt a domestic 
industry or may delay its development. Those tariff or non-tariff measures may be imposed 
when a sizeable surge in imports is observed, or when the price of imports decreases. Such 
measures may also be imposed in an emergency before a definitive policy has been implemented. 
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Those safeguard measures apply mainly to agricultural products. For the time being 
Morocco only applies safeguard measures on the imports of fresh bananas. 
However, one may wonder whether those safeguard measures are compatible with the 
RTAs in which Morocco participates. 
6. Consistency of rules of origin 
Comparison of the rules of origin that Morocco applies according to its various trade 
agreements reveals that these rules may be contradictory. A prominent example of such 
a conflict in rules origin can be found between GAFTA and EMFTA. 
Namely, EMFTA allows, cumulation of origins between contracting countries, that is Morocco 
and EU members, and also with products originating from Tunisia and Algeria. This possibility 
however remains theoretical since it necessitates that rules of origin be consistent between 
the participating countries. This is however not the case, because sufficient transformation 
is defined thanks to a percentage criterion (namely a forty percent added value in a member 
country) for trade between Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, because their GAFTA membership, 
whereas it is defined with the process criterion by EMFTA. 
This results in a conflict between the two agreements to which Morocco is part, which 
may cost it a better access to the EU market. 
7. Compatibility of Morocco's commitments under 
GAFTA and EMFTA 
Another interference appears between GAFTA and EMFTA. Namely, GAFTA provides 
that no party-state may grant any preferential advantages to a non-Arab state that exceeds 
those granted to party-states (Article 7.5 of the Agreement). If the pace of liberalisation 
between Morocco and the EU within the Euromed partnership exceeds GAFTAs, free 
trade may be reached with the EU before it is obtained with members of GAFTA, which 
will put Morocco in contradiction with its obligations contracted under GAFTA. 
8. Compatibility of Morocco's policy with production 
incentives 
As stated in the last WTO trade policy report, "Moreover, the mixed overall escalation 
of tariffs, subject to incentives, does not encourage certain production activities (particularly 
of semi-finished goods), for which Morocco appears to have a comparative advantage". 
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Part 3: Potential effects 
I. The Consequences of spaghetti regionalism 
Morocco's participation in a complex network of several regional trade agreements of 
various kinds and a plethora of bilateral agreements is as likely as any to correspond to 
what is called spaghetti regionalism by international economists10. That expression was 
precisely coined by Jagdish Baghwati (1993) to describe the ongoing tendency of most 
countries to embark on a number of sometimes overlapping regional trade agreements. 
Bagwhati's original concern was to wonder whether such regional activity was likely to 
lead to multilateral trade liberalization or to hinder free trade. From the point of view of 
a single country, the question of the compatibility of its various regional trade agreements 
also arises. 
To sketch the consequences of its multiple regional trade agreements on Morocco's 
economic welfare, one should first recall the general arguments regarding the desirability 
of regional integration for a country (I. I.) before turning to the specific issue posed by 
multiple regional trade agreements (I .2.). 
I. I. The cost-benefit analysis of regional trade agreements 
The standard textbook economic analysis of regional trade agreements challenges the 
intuitive view that regional integration should stand halfway between complete protection 
and full liberalization in terms of welfare. 
The basic rationale for that argument rests on the idea that reducing protection on a 
partner's products may artificially lower those products' relative prices. Consumers may 
then prefer tax-free products originating in the partner country to their substitutes 
originating in other countries, even though the latter would be cheaper if they were not 
taxed. Imports of third countries' products would accordingly be replaced by costlier 
imports from the partner country. This phenomenon is deemed trade diversion in the 
literature. Viner (1950) demonstrated that if the creation of a custom union resulted in 
such trade diversion, it may result in an overall welfare loss because the importing country 
would import more expensive goods than before the trade agreement was adopted. 
It can be argued that spaghetti regionalism may reduce the probability of trade diversion 
because it increases the number of countries whose imports are free of taxation or less 
heavily taxed. That argument must however be qualified. It only holds if the country's 
multiple regional trade agreements are signed with partners whose comparative advantages 
differ. Otherwise, the risk of trade diversion is as likely with multiple bilateral agreements 
0A cursory inspection of the 2003 WTO trade policy report allows counting at least eight regional trade agreements and about 
twenty bilateral agreements. 
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as with a single one. For instance, Morocco's bilateral free trade agreement with Jordan 
is unlikely to reduce the trade diversion caused by its bilateral agreement with Egypt, 
because the two countries have fairly similar comparative advantages. 
Regional trade agreements can however be advocated as a means to achieving a second 
best outcome. Namely, where multilateral trade liberalization is not feasible, it can be 
argued that regional integration, possibly through spaghetti regionalism may raise welfare. 
It is in particular the case when trade creation dominates trade diversion, namely when 
the benefit of raising trade in some sectors exceeds the distortions imposed on the 
participating countries by trade diversion in other sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, the existence of economies of scale creates an additional incentive to integrate 
markets, regardless of the way in which comparative advantages are exploited. In other 
words, the benefit of cutting down production costs by producing for a wider market 
may outweigh welfare losses due to trade diversion. 
The last two arguments however call for increased caution when designing trade agreements. 
Extra care should accordingly be spent on the choice of the sectors to be liberalized and the 
partners with whom trade in those sectors should be liberalized. The comparative advantage 
of trading partners and the existence of economies of scale should carefully be taken into account. 
It can also be argued, as Ibarra-Yunez (2003) does, that the main benefits of regional trade 
agreements are not to be found in the economic realm but in the political realm. Thus, 
improving the country's security is often mentioned as a goal of regional trade agreements. 
Schiff and Winters (1998) accordingly claim that free trade agreements could play a role 
in calming the political and military tensions between countries. 
It is also argued that participating in a regional trade agreement is a means of achieving 
an improvement of the country's bargaining power. Bargaining power must be understood 
here as pertaining both to trade negotiations and general international relations. It has 
therefore an economic as well as a purely diplomatic component. 
The possibility of increasing Morocco's security and improving its bargaining power may thus 
be seen as a chief benefit of its participation in the Arab League. Unfortunately, those benefits 
cannot easily be weighed against economic benefits and costs, let alone quantitatively assessed. 
The motive of political cooperation is consonant with that of policy lock-in. It is thus 
argued that contracting the obligation to liberalize trade is a means to both achieving and 
signalling the credibility of a reform package. A country thereby signals its commitment 
to reforms and openness to trade to foreign investors and entrepreneurs. Commitments 
can even be made part of regional trade agreements. This fosters the increased attractiveness 
of a country's participation in a free trade agreement with respect to Foreign Direct 
Investment as Baldwin (1992) contends. 
34 
If signalling the country's commitment is one of regional trade agreements' benefits, then 
signing several such agreements may be more visible. This accordingly creates an incentive 
for spaghetti regionalism, as lbarra-Yunez (2003) suggests. He refers to this motive as the 
"strategy of being noticed". That argument has been put forward in support of Mexico's 
participation in NAFTA. It is to a large extent applicable to southern countries' membership 
in the Euromed process. Thus, participating in that process signals that one country's 
policy will be supervised by the European Union. 
Finally, lbarra-Yunez (2003) also underlines the possibility of a "negotiation learning curve". He 
suggests that the experience that a country's administration acquires in negotiating a multiplicity 
of regional trade agreements results in a greater capacity to negotiate subsequent regional trade 
agreements. This phenomenon may also be a political cause of spaghetti regionalism. 
1.2. Specificities of spaghetti regionalism 
However, the piling up of multiple regional trade agreements also entails complexities of 
its own that are often overlooked in the literature on regional integration. The first of 
those is the issue of the compatibility of regional trade agreements. From a legal point of 
view, each new trade agreement adds a new set of rights and obligations for participating 
countries. Due to the complexity of those agreements, those rights and obligations may 
well contradict each other. 
A chief example of such contradiction is to be found in rules of origin. Those rules determine 
the official origin of traded goods, which in turn determines whether they come under 
the scope of the trade agreement or whether they remain subject to trade restrictions. 
Those rules are necessary when goods are produced in several countries. It is frequent 
for different agreements to provide for different rules of origin. Those different rules of 
origin may then be incompatible. 
As regards Morocco, it appears that the rules of origin provided for in GAFTA may prevent 
the country from reaping the full benefits of its participation in the Euromed process. 
Thus, under Euromed, legal origins are defined according to a process criterion. They are 
on the other hand defined according to a percentage criterion in GAFTA. According to 
both criteria a product is considered as having been produced in the zone when it has 
undergone sufficient transformation in the zone. However, sufficient transformation is 
defined according to a list of specified operations in the former, whereas origin is conferred 
when a sufficient share of value added was created in the zone in the latter. 
This may not necessarily be an issue if the Euromed agreement did not provide for 
cumulation of origins among southern countries, but it does. Namely, the operations 
necessary to confer origin in the zone may have been carried out in several member 
countries instead of one. This should increase the range of goods that could benefit from 
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tariff exemptions since it allows the production of those goods in several countries instead 
of one. Nevertheless, this would require a uniform definition of rules of origin among 
southern partners to the Euromed agreement. Since they are committed to applying 
different rules within GAFTA and the Euromed, they cannot benefit from cumulation of 
origins to which they would be entitled in the latter. 
Moreover, it has been argued that existing regional trade agreements may increase the 
economic cost of adhering to subsequent regional trade agreements. This finding is obtained 
by Grossman and Helpman (1995), Panagaryia and Findlay (1996), and Levy (1997), and 
Krishna (1998). Their arguments follow a common thread. They rest on the fact that 
groups who need protection tend to lose from trade agreements, whereas groups that 
are competitive benefit from them. When the first trade agreement is negotiated, the 
former only lose preferential treatment in their home market. However, when subsequent 
trade agreements are signed, they lose preferential treatment in larger zones. By contrast, 
the marginal benefit of signing an additional agreement to those who benefit from trade 
follows no particular pattern. Indeed, that benefit depends on the size of the partner's 
market that is independent from the number of existing regional trade agreements. 
One may therefore expect an increasing marginal cost of signing new regional trade 
agreements whereas the marginal benefit is constant. This may reduce the attraction and 
the political sustainability of signing regional trade agreements that may yet be optimal 
from an aggregate point of view. 
True, this argument can be weighed against the idea that a free trade area becomes more 
attractive to new members as it gets larger. However, Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and 
Yi (1996) argue that member countries have an incentive to limit participation to a finite 
number of partners. Although Freund (2000) shows that this argument does not apply 
to bilateral agreements, it again underlines the importance of the order in which agreements 
are signed. This should attract attention to the order in which regional trade agreements 
are signed. It should also be borne in mind when different agreements clash and it comes 
to choosing between two sets of obligations, as it is partly the case between the Euromed 
and GAFTA agreements. 
2. Impact of the Euromed agreement on Morocco 
Many descriptions of Morocco's trade reveal that it exhibits an unexploited trade potential. 
In that context, the implementation of the Euromed accord may be a means to tap that 
potential. In this section, we first comment on estimates of the gap in Morocco's trade, 
and then we provide an evaluation of the effects of that agreement. 
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2. I. Morocco's untapped trade potential with the European 
Union 
Unlike trade integration with other regions of the world, like the former socialist European 
countries, the process of trade integration between Mediterranean countries, Morocco 
included, and the rest of the world has remained slow. In that context of low integration 
in world trade, trade relations between those countries and the European Union stand 
as an exception. That exception may be explained by historical factors and cultural links 
between the two areas. They are also largely the consequence of geographic proximity 
and of the complementarity of their comparative advantages. 
However, as Ferragina et al. (2004) underline, trade between the European Union and 
Maghreb countries remain both asymmetric and concentrated. Namely, those countries' 
trade with the European Union represents a much larger share of their GDPs than the 
European Union's trade with them does in its own GDP Overall, the European Union's 
trade with its Mediterranean partners hardly amounts to 3% of its GDP In contrast 
Morocco's imports from the European Union amounted to 54% of its GDP in 
As a consequence, Morocco's trade is also very concentrated. Thus the European Union 
is the destination of 72.5% of Morocco's exports'2. Those considerations suggest that 
Morocco may not make the most of its trade potential with the European Union. To get 
a more precise insight on that issue, a yardstick is needed. In other words, Morocco's 
actual trade must be assessed against a benchmark measuring what could be expected if 
existing impediments to trade were abolished. This is usually done by estimating a gravity 
model and comparing predicted and actual trade. The gravity model estimates the 
relationship between bilateral trade and its main determinants, that is geographic distance 
and size. For instance, the IMF (2002) used that method to assess the MENA region's 
trade potential over the 1995-1999 period. It found that MENA was the second region 
of the world in terms of unexploited trade possibilities, behind South-East Asia. In a similar 
exercise, based on 1992 figures, Miniesy et al. (2004) also observe that MENA countries 
do not make the most of their trade potential. Strikingly, they find that this is particularly 
true for trade with the European Union. 
However, there is to our knowledge only one study that provides specific estimates for 
Morocco. Thus, Ferragina et al. (2004) used a gravity equation to estimate the trade 
potential of MENA and CEEC countries with Europe. In so doing, they compute a predicted 
to actual trade ratio for Morocco over the 1995-2002 period. Apart from the fact that 
their study is the only one that allows an evaluation of Morocco's trade potential, it is also 
the only one to provide an estimation of the evolution of that country's trade potential, 
That figure reached 62.6% if other European countries were included. 
2 
Europe in general was the destination of 75.5% of Morocco's exports. 
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thanks to a panel data analysis. The results of their econometric exercise are striking. Thus 
Ferragina et al. (2004) observe that the ratio of exports or imports ranged from 3.5 to 
4 in 2002, depending on the European partner under consideration. This means that the 
potential for fostering trade relations between Morocco and its partners is still to be 
exploited. This is even true for a country like France, with which Morocco's potential to 
actual trade is of similar magnitude as for other European Union countries, in spite of 
those countries' historical links. 
More striking still, is the fact that Morocco's potential to actual trade ratios exhibit a 
constant trend. This is observable for Morocco's trade with the European Union as a 
whole and with countries such as Italy, Germany, and France. Only do Spain and the United 
Kingdom stand as exceptions and exhibit a slightly downward trend. This means that 
recent efforts to integrate Morocco's economy had not yet been successful over Ferragina 
et al. (2004)'s period of study, or only met very limited success. 
Finally, a third result that appears in Ferragina et al. (2004)'s study is that the ratio of 
Morocco's potential to actual exports to the EU systematically exceeds the ratio of 
Morocco's actual to potential imports from the EU, although the difference is smaller than 
for other MENA countries. This finding may mean that there are more impediments to 
Moroccan exports to the European Union than for the European Union's exports to 
Morocco. As there exists consistent evidence of an untapped trade potential between 
Morocco and the European Union, one may want to estimate the possible impact of trade 
liberalization on actual trade. This is the focus of the next section. 
2.2. An Estimation of the impact of the Euromed agreement on 
Morocco's trade 
The existence of a gap between Morocco's trade volume predicted by a gravity equation 
and its actual trade with the European Union suggests that the present process of trade 
integration between the two partners may result in an increase in trade. However, it does 
not help in determining by how much trade may be raised. One may nevertheless consider 
that predicted trade volumes provide an estimation of the upper bound of what could be 
achieved. If one was to interpret Ferragina et al. (2004)'s results, one would conclude 
that as the potential to actual trade ratio is equal to 3.5, up to a three-fold increase of 
trade between Morocco and the European Union may result from the Euromed process. 
That lofty figure may however seem overly optimistic, even unrealistic. Moreover, other 
impediments to trade exist in addition to formal legal barriers that may prevent trade to 
reach such a level. To name but a few, the quality of infrastructure (Longo and Sekkat, 
2004) or the institutional environment (MEon and Sekkat, 2004) have been shown to 
influence trade. 
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A more careful examination of the impact of liberalization of Moroccan trade with the 
European Union is therefore warranted to provide more reliable estimates. To our 
knowledge, the most comprehensive analysis is provided by Rutherford et al. (1997). 
These authors use a general equilibrium model to investigate the consequences on the 
Moroccan economy of several trade liberalization scenarios, ranging from improved access 
to the European Union's fruits and vegetables market to full unilateral liberalization with 
the rest of the world. Before turning to commenting their results, a description of their 
modelling strategy is necessary to understand the robustness and reliability of their 
estimates of the consequences of Morocco's trade integration. 
Rutherford et al. (I 997)'s basic framework is what is referred to as a generic computable 
general equilibrium model. It describes the equilibrium of a single economy, namely 
Morocco, and its reaction to exogenous shocks, consisting here of trade liberalization 
shocks. Following de Melo and Tarr (I 993) and Harrison et al. (1993), Rutherford et 
al. (I 997)'s model consists of three groups of non-linear equations that respectively 
describe the equilibrium between supply and demand for goods and factors markets 
(including foreign transactions), the equality between income and expenditures, both for 
the private and public sectors, and the equality between prices and costs for producers. 
Consistent with the latter equilibrium condition is the assumption that all sectors are 
competitive. Goods are produced with both labor and capital under constant returns to 
scale technologies. 
There are 39 production sectors, based on the social accounting matrix constructed by 
Mateus et al. (1988) for the World Bank. The drawback of that matrix is that it is based 
on 1980 data. Rutherford et al. (1997) argue that this drawback may not be as restrictive 
as one may think. Indeed, these authors underline that sectoral shares did not significantly 
change over the I 980s. They moreover updated their protection data to 1991 levels, 
which partly makes up for the drawback of using a somewhat dated social accounting 
matrix. The social accounting matrix that they use has on the other hand the advantage 
of distinguishing the main sectors that may be affected by trade liberalization in Morocco. 
Namely, the citrus fruits, vegetables, sugar, meat and dairy products, textiles, apparel, 
fishing, and phosphates sectors appear separately in the social accounting matrix. 
All those sectors are supposed to produce goods that are differentiated according to their 
origin. That is, domestic and foreign goods are supposed to be imperfect substitutes. Two 
important sectors for the Moroccan economy however stand as exceptions: the meat 
and dairy sector and the sugar sector. These sectors are assumed homogeneous. Those 
assumptions are embodied in the model thanks to the specification of the representative 
consumer's utility function. 
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On the production side, labor is assumed perfectly mobile across sectors. This assumption makes 
it possible to investigate the impact of different policy packages on the allocation of labor. 
Finally, government revenue is assumed to be obtained from value added taxes, employment 
and corporation taxes on factor employment, excise taxes on production output, and last 
but not least, import tariffs. This allows the study of the consequences of trade policies 
on government revenues. 
With that model, Rutherford et at. (1997) investigate six policy scenarios against a common 
benchmark. The scenarios under study are I) a full trade agreement with the European Union 
(FTA), 2) unilateral elimination of import protection against EU imports (EULIB), 3) free access 
for Moroccan fruits and vegetables to the European market (ACCESS), 4) elimination of 
protection against non EU imports (LIBROW), 5) elimination of protection on all imports (i.e. 
EU and non-EU: LIBALL), and 6) full free trade agreement with the European Union 
complemented by the elimination of protection of non-EU imports at the same time (FTAALL). 
One easily sees that scenario I is a combination of scenarios 2 and 3. By the same token, 
scenario 6 is a combination of scenarios I and 4. Moreover, comparisons of scenarios 4, 2, and 
5 and of scenarios I and 4 allows to gauge the possible trade diversion effects that may 
accompany the process of regional trade integration with the European Union. 
All those scenarios are weighed against the status quo. This is modelled as a situation 
where Morocco imposes no non-tariff barrier on its imports, and its exports of fruits, 
vegetables, trousers, and canned sardines are taxed. All simulations rest on the assumption 
that trade protection creates a price distortion equivalent to eight percent of the actual 
price of fruits and vegetables. Trade liberalization can therefore be taken into account as 
an eight percent increase in the prices of Morocco's exports and a fall in import prices. 
On the flip side, trade liberalization implies a loss of revenue for the Moroccan government. 
As all simulations assume a constant balanced budget, they all also assume that lost import 
duties are exactly compensated for by increases in VAT. VAT revenues are therefore 
endogenous in the model. 
As all scenarios imply a variation of the relative prices of imports, exports, and domestic 
products, they all result in demand shifts that in turn affect the allocation of labor and 
capital across sectors. The results of the simulations therefore depend on the elasticity 
of supply and demand of each traded good and factor. The findings that are displayed in 
the following graphs are therefore related to three scenarios, based on a high, medium, 
and low elasticity of supply in resource sectors. We will mainly focus on the medium 
elasticity scenario in our comments. In fact, it appears that the quantitative results depend 
to a great extent on the elasticity of supply in the resource sectors, insofar as the greater 
the elasticity, the greater the expected impact of liberalization in terms of both output 
and welfare. However, a consistent pattern appears in the comparison of the different 
scenarios of trade liberalization. 
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Figure I a: changes in welfare as a percentage of GDP 
Figure I b: changes in VAT rates (in percentage) 
Figure I c: Percentage of labor that changes job 
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The most limited policy scenario is the free access of Moroccan goods to the European 
Union market. In that scenario, welfare increases by about a quarter of a point of GDP As 
the impact remains limited, it is not surprising to find that only a small share of the labor 
force has to relocate to adapt to the trade policy shock. That scenario is however the only 
one to result in a reduction of VAT, although the reduction is admittedly of limited magnitude. 
As production increases whereas imports remain taxed, the increased access of Moroccan 
products to the European market raises tax revenues, which allows a reduction in VAT. 
The symmetric policy scenario is a unilateral removal of Moroccan tariffs on European 
imports. This policy's welfare impact amounts to one to two percents of which is 
up to seven times greater than the previous one's. Unsurprisingly, its impact on the 
allocation of labor is also greater, as it concerns 2.6% of the labor force when the elasticity 
of supply in resource sectors is of medium magnitude. Moreover, the impact in terms of 
tariff revenue is also much larger and positive. VAT rates have to be raised to compensate 
for the loss of tariff revenues by as much as 60%, depending on the elasticity of supply 
in resource sectors. 
A free trade agreement between Morocco and the European Union is the sum of the two 
previous scenarios. Its impact is approximately equal to the sum of the impacts of those 
scenarios. Namely, welfare is raised by I .52% of GDP when the elasticity of supply takes 
its medium value. 
If trade policy removies tariffs against the rest of the world, EU excepted, most effects 
seem dampened when compared to those involving the European Union, although they 
are qualitatively similar. This finding reflects the fact that the EU is by far Morocco's chief 
trade partner. The next two scenarios allow the investigation of trade diversion effects 
of trade integration with the EU. This further move increases welfare with respect to a 
similar move from the European Union by only about one percentage point of GDP 
Unsurprisingly, VAT needs to be increased further. 
What is more intriguing is the fact that the figures for the relocation of the labor force 
are of similar magnitude as the previous ones. Still, if openness to trade with the rest of 
the world in addition to the European Union created new opportunities for trade, exports 
would increase, which should make it necessary to reallocate more production factors. 
The only possible explanation is that some trade with the rest of the world simply replaces 
some trade with the European Union. In a nutshell, privileged trade with the European 
Union diverted some trade. However, as Rutherford et al. (1997) stress, trade diversion 
is not dominant, as it does not prevent welfare from increasing when the ETA with the 
European Union is implemented. 
Finally, a trade scenario consisting in a free trade area with Europe complemented by a 
liberalization of imports with the rest of the world, which would combine LI BALL and ACCESS, 
42 
would further increase welfare. Overall, it appears that increased liberalization is always 
associated with greater welfare. However, only the first move toward liberalization (be it with 
the European Union or the rest of the world) produces a sizeable reallocation of labor. 
As it is a difficult exercise to model a whole economy, one should legitimately wonder 
whether the results obtained are sensitive to the assumptions on which they rest. We have 
already commented on the impact of different values of the elasticity of output. Rutherford 
et al. (1997) go further and also investigate the sensitivity of their results to different values 
of the elasticity of substitution between domestic consumption and imports and different 
values of the elasticity of substitution between imports from different sources. In both cases, 
they observe that their results remain qualitatively, though not quantitatively, unchanged. 
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis of the welfare effect of various integration schemes 
0.5 
FTA 
Source: Rutherford et a!. (1997). 
As regards the impact of elasticity of substitution of domestic and foreign production, they 
observe that it is positively related with the welfare benefits of trade integration. On the 
other hand, they find that when the elasticity of substitution between EU imports and 
imports from the rest of the world increases, the benefits of preferential trade agreements 
decrease. This is due to a greater loss as a result of trade diversion. In accordance with 
that finding, the elasticity of substitution between imports of various origins is unrelated 
to the welfare impact of multilateral trade liberalization since it creates no trade diversion. 
Rutherford et al. (1997) conclude their simulations by a sensitivity analysis. Namely, they 
run their simulations on a large number of combinations of parameters values (i.e. 1000). 
That procedure allows them to provide confidence intervals for their point estimates of 
the effects of their different scenarios. Figure 2 above displays the point estimates and 
bounds of the 95% confidence interval of the welfare effects of those scenarios. As the 
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results of Rutherford et al. (I 997)'s simulations are fairly robust. Namely, one may be 
95% confident that all integration processes increase welfare, although the exact amount 
by which they do is uncertain. Figure 2 also allows us to establish the significance of the 
ranking of the different scenarios considered by Rutherford et al. (1997). More precisely, 
whereas the ranking of FTA, EULIB, and LIBROW cannot be established with certainty, 
because their confidence intervals overlap, ACCESS clearly appears as the least welfare- 
improving scenario. Finally, LIBALL and FTAALL seem to dominate other scenarios, but 
cannot be ranked with respect to each other, since their confidence intervals overlap. 
3. Impact of GAFTA 
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) is the most recent step taken by Arab 
countries to develop trade between them. Although the Arab League was created on the 
of March 1945, and several attempts of regional integration have been made under 
its auspices, GAFTA is considered to be the most significant move toward trade integration 
to date. Indeed, it represents 90% of Arab foreign trade and 95% of intra-Arab trade'3. 
The project was given impetus during the 1996 Cairo Arab summit, was agreed upon on 
the I of February I 997, and came into force on the I St of January I 998. It is due to 
produce its full effects in 2008. Before investigating its potential effect (3.2.), the present 
situation of intra-Arab trade must be assessed. It is on all accounts a situation of very 
limited integration (3. I .). 
3.I. The Arab missing trade 
As Devlin and Page (2001) emphasize, very little attention has been so far paid to Arab 
regional trade. The diagnosis of lower than normal trade therefore rests on crude statistical 
analysis and on only one systematic statistical investigation. Available evidence, however 
tentative, is nevertheless edifying. 
A cursory look at Arab trade statistics reveals that intra-regional trade is limited in the Arab 
region. This is highlighted in Figure 3 that displays the geographic destination of Arab exports. 
Arab countries' first exports destination is by far industrial countries, which buy 54% of Arab 
countries' exports. The second destination of Arab products is Asia, which imports 29. I 
of Arab exports. Other Arab countries are only the third destination of Arab countries' 
exports. Intra-Arab exports amount to I I billion US dollars, which represents 8.2% of their 
total exports. Those figures become more revealing when they are compared to equivalent 
statistics for other regional groupings. Thus, intra-regional exports amount to 56.8% in the 
European Union and 5 I % in NAFTA. Sure, these examples may sound too specific and far 
from the reality of Arab trade. Nevertheless, intra-Arab trade seems low even in comparison 
with regions that are more similar in terms of development and income. Namely, countries 
13Arab trade must be understood to refer to the trade of the twenty-two members of the Arab League. 
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of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) make 25.5% of their 
exports among them. The same figure amounts to I I .4% for members of the Andean Pact 
(Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela). 
One may rightfully argue that those figures are somewhat biased because of oil exports. As 
most Arab countries are producers of oil, this mechanically raises their exports to the rest of 
the world, and shrinks their regional to total trade ratios14. Devlin and Page (2001) provide 
statistics corrected for oil exports. They thus find that Arab regional non-oil exports totalled 
19% of total Arab exports in 1996. This figure sounds less pessimistic than the previous one. 
Moreover, the importance of oil in Arab countries' trade seems to have followed a downward 
trend. Besides, non-oil intra-regional trade has persistently exceeded intra-regional oil trade 
since the early I 980s, as Devlin and Page (2001) show. These facts must however be put in 
perspective, as intra-Arab non-oil exports only amounted to 2% of Arab countries' GDPs. 
Moreover, since 1970, regional Arab trade has only marginally increased. It already 
amounted to 5.2% of the region's total exports in 1970. In comparison, intra-regional 
trade rose from I .7% to I I .4% of the region's trade in the Andean Pact, and from I I .4% 
to 25.5% in the Southern Cone between 1970 and 1998. 
Figure 3: Direction of Arab trade, 1998 (billions of US dollars) 
Source: IME 
In addition, statistics must be interpreted with as they hkle wild sub-regjonal discrepancies. 
Thus, compared to other members of the Arab League, Maghreb in general and Morocco in particular 
seem to take a smaller part in intra-Arab trade. This is revealed by Figure 4 that displays the direction 
of Maghreb's exports to other Arab countries. It reveals that Maghreb countries are by far the main 
recipients of Maghreb exports to Arab countries. lntra-Maghreb exports totalled one billion dollars 
in 1998, which amounted to 63.2% of Maghreb's exports to Arab countries. 
'4This argument however does not apply to Morocco, which does not export oil. 
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Figure 4: Direction of Maghreb's exports to other Arab Countries, 1998 
(billions of US dollars) 
As regards Morocco more specifically, it appears relatively weakly involved in intra-Arab trade. Thus, 
Devlin and Page (2001) remark that intra-regional non-oil exports only amount to 3% of Morocco's 
exports, whereas they reach 30 to 40% in Syria or Lebanon. On the positive side, Morocco's exports 
are better diversified in the Arab world than other Arab countries', as Figure 5 shows. Namely, 
although Saudi Arabia (29.7%), Algeria (24.8%), Syria (12%) are clearly Morocco's three main Arab 
trade partners, none of them buys more than one third of the Kingdom's exports. In comparison, 
Morocco alone is the destination of 60.9% of Algeria's Arab exports, 66.8% of Bahrain's Arab 
exports are shipped to Saudi Arabia, which is also the recipient of 82.2% of Yemen's Arab exports, 
69.4% of Oman's Arab exports, and 44.2% of Egypt's Arab exports. 
Figure 5: Direction of Morocco's exports to other Arab Countries, 1998 
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However, those statistics could be misleading if they were not assessed against a benchmark. This 
is what Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000)'s analysis allows. As usual, it is based on a standard gravity 
model. Their model is estimated on a sample of 18 Arab countries and 43 non-Arab countries, 
over the 1995-1997 period. All variables are averaged over the period so that the gravity equation 
can be estimated as a cross-section. Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) focus on estimating their equation 
on imports to control for the impact of oil exports. They control the usual size and distance 
variables, and introduce dummies accounting for Arab trade. They in particular use an intra-Arab 
trade dummy that is meant to capture the impact on bilateral trade of the two partners being 
Arab countries. That variable therefore measures the excess or deficit of bilateral trade with 
respect to the benchmark provided by the gravity model. 
Unsurprisingly, Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) find that dummy variable to be significantly negative. 
This means that intra-Arab trade is statistically lower than what it should be when the size and 
proximity of Arab countries are taken into account. Most of all, the coefficient of that variable 
allows to provide an estimate of the gap between actual and potential Arab trade. According to 
Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000)'s estimates, imports of one Arab country from another is on average 
one half (52.2%) of what it should be given their sizes and proximity. 
Those authors subsequently refine their analysis by introducing more specific regional dummies, 
controlling for intra-Maghreb and intra GCC trade. They find that intra-GCC imports are less 
than 2% of what they should be, whereas intra-Maghreb imports are one half of their predicted 
value. Finally, when those sub-regional effects are controlled, they find that intra-Arab trade should 
be about JO to 15 percent higher than what it is. 
Those figures are sizeable. They should however be taken with care as they result from a single 
cross-section equation, with the usual limitation of that type of exercise. Further investigation is 
therefore warranted, but one may be fairly confident in the fact that intra-Arab trade is lower 
than what it may be. The question is now to determine how GAFTA may help in filling that gap. 
3.2. An estimation of GAFTA's impact 
Unfortunately, there is to our knowledge no analysis that may provide estimates of the impact 
of GAFTA on Morocco's trade with the same accuracy as Rutherford et al. (I 997)'s analysis of 
the effects of the Euromed agreement. To get a gross impression of what may be expected, one 
can either analyse the country's scope for increased trade with its Arab partners, based on the 
complementarities of their productive structures, or extend the results of other studies and apply 
them to Morocco. These are the two routes we are going to follow. 
First, some commentators of Arab trade have expressed their scepticism on the capacity of Arab 
regional trade agreements to be very effective. Their first argument rests on the magnitude of 
trade costs in the region. Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) underline that intra-Arab trade may be 
hindered by the difficulty of the geographic terrain and by the distance between Arab countries. 
Specifically, it appears that several countries are indeed geographically closer to their non-Arab 
partners than to the rest of the Arab League. This in particular is true of Morocco, which is without 
doubt closer to the European Union than to Mashreq countries for instance. 
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As gravity equations show, distance is a significant impediment to trade. One may on the other 
hand argue that gravity equations also demonstrate the role of cultural distance in shaping trade 
flows. In that respect, the Arab world's linguistic and cultural proximity may to some extent make 
for physical distance. 
Second, doubts have been expressed on the complementarity of Arab countries' productive 
structures, for Instance by Fischer (I 993). It is thus argued that Arab countries' endowments in 
natural resources and factors of production are broadly similar. Those countries therefore share 
the same comparative advantages, which limits the scope for mutual inter-industry trade, according 
to the traditional theory of international trade. On the other hand, it can also be argued that those 
countries lack a diversified export base of manufactured goods. This may in turn reduce the 
potential for intra-industry trade, which might have compensated for the lack of mutual comparative 
advantage. 
This view can however be challenged. Closer inspection of Arab countries' trade thus reveals that 
complementarities exist. For instance, Havrylyshyn (1997) computed a "complementarity index" 
that shows that the Arab region's product complementarity is of the same order of magnitude 
as those of MERCOSUR and APEC. Moreover, Devlin and Page (2001) study the revealed 
comparative advantages that Arab trade exhibits1 5• They observe that comparative advantages 
can be revealed even if one narrowly focuses on intra-Arab trade. They thus observe that Morocco 
in 1996 had a revealed comparative advantage on the rest of the Arab countries in 62 sectors, 
and a comparative disadvantage in 164 sectors. Among the 62 sectors in which Morocco exhibited 
a comparative advantage vis-á-vis the rest of the Arab League, it had a "strong" comparative 
advantage in 44 sectors'6. In other words Morocco had a comparative advantage in 27.4% of the 
goods that it traded with its Arab partners, while it conceded a comparative disadvantage in the 
remaining 72.6%. By contrast, at the same time, it demonstrated a comparative advantage with 
only I 7.9% of its traded goods with the EU. 
A closer inspection of Arab countries' revealed comparative advantages shows that complementarities 
may clearly exist. For instance four of the top ten Moroccan revealed comparative advantages 
with the rest of the Arab region are related to the textile industry ("other woven textile fabrics", 
"knitted fabrics", "textile articles", "textile clothing accessories"). At the same time, the "vegetable 
fibres (cotton excluded)" sector is Egypt's largest revealed comparative advantage. A complementarity 
could be exploited here. Alternatively, Jordan's chief comparative advantage with respect to the 
Arab zone is to be found in the "raw fur skins" sector, while the leather sector exhibits Morocco's 
third largest revealed comparative advantage. There again, a complementarity could be exploited. 
A final argument in favor of GAFTA's effects being sizeable is the fact that its members' trade 
policies have been so far restrictive. In 1995, government revenue shares generated by trade taxes 
Revealed comparative advantages are measured by the Balassa index. It is defined as the ratio of a sector's share in a country's 
exports to that sector's share in world or regional trade. If the ratio is greater than one for a sector in a country, the country is an 
above-average exporter of the good considered. He therefore has a comparative advantage in that sector. 
tWhat Devlin and Page (2001) name a strong comparative advantage is an advantage that is revealed by a Balassa ratio greater than 2.25. 
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were almost three times as high in the zone as in Latin American and Asian countries, as Devlin 
and Page (2001) remark. As a result, Arab countries' openness remains smaller than what it should 
be according to their sizes and development levels, which is observed by Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000). 
For Morocco, the ratio of its actual openness to the openness predicted by Al-Atrash and 
Yousef (2000) on the basis of its GDP and GDP per capita is only 21 .52%. This can be viewed 
as a sign of the Kingdom's trade policy's restrictiveness. Removing existing legal impediments to 
trade may therefore positively affect its participation in regional trade. 
Predicting the magnitude of that effect is however more difficult. To our knowledge, there is no 
study available that assesses the quantitative effects of GAFTA on Morocco's exports. However, 
it may be possible to use the results of previous work on African trade to derive the effect of that 
agreement. This is what we do in the rest of this section. 
Our strategy rests on the assumption that distance imposes costs, and that it is these costs that 
reduce trade when distance increases between two partner countries. If one could express the 
cost of tariffs into their "kilometric" equivalent, one could derive the impact of the elimination 
or reduction of those tariffs on the volume of trade. Of course, tariffs are a fixed cost. When that 
cost is compared with transport costs, which increase with distance, it should be relatively smaller 
for countries that are further from the exporting country. The impact of the tariff reduction on 
bilateral trade should therefore not only depend on the magnitude of the tariff reduction but also 
on the proximity of the two partner countries. The simulations that follow are based on this 
intuition. The exact method that we used is described in Appendix 4. 
As we used two estimates of transport costs and of the average tariff, we studied four scenarios that 
were all compared with the true value of Morocco's exports to the rest of the Arab region. Scenario 
I corresponds to a situation where both the transport cost and the initial tariff take high values. In 
scenario 2, only transport costs assume their high value. Scenario 3 describes a situation where both 
parameters have a low value. The transport cost is low but the tariff is high in scenario 4. 
Figure 6 below compares the implications of the four scenarios in terms of aggregate Moroccan 
exports to the rest of GAFTA countries. All four are based on 1998 values of exports and are 
weighed against the true value of exports in that year. 











True exports Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
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Unsurprisingly, all scenarios imply a increase in Morocco's exports with respect to the status quo. 
It shows that the results of the estimation are sensitive to the values assumed by the parameters. 
More to the point, the lower the transport cost and the higher the initial average tariff rate, the 
larger the effects of trade liberalisation. In the most favorable scenario, where the transport cost 
is low and the initial tariff is high, Moroccan exports can even increase fourfold. In the most 
restrictive scenario, Morocco's exports to its Arab partners still increase by 17%. As the comparisons 
of different scenarios depend directly on the value of the parameters, we will not comment on 
them any further. The reader may use the formula displayed in Appendix 4 to test other scenarios. 
What may be more interesting is the distortion in intra-Arab trade that GAFTA may generate. 
Indeed, as the magnitude of the tariff duty relative to overall transport costs diminishes when the 
partner country is more distant, one should expect trade liberalisation to impact exports to 
neighbouring countries more than distant ones. Estimated distortions depend on the value of the 
parameters. We therefore display the results of our computations for our four scenarios, in addition 
to the benchmark case. 
The results clearly show that exports to closer countries stand to benefit the most from trade 
liberalisation. If one focuses on Morocco's four main trade partners, one is led to conclude that 
the shares of the Kingdom's exports to Algeria and Tunisia increase, while the shares of its exports 
shipped to Syria and Saudi Arabia both shrink. 
Figure 7a: GAFTA's geographic distortion of trade 
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Figure 7b: A Ranking of the four scenarios 
These results stem from the fact that Syria and Saudi Arabia are more distant from Morocco than 
Tunisia and Algeria. For the latter, duties presently amount to a much larger share of the cost of 
trade with Morocco. Removing such barriers to trade should therefore provide a greater impetus 
to these countries' imports from Morocco. The theory of international trade supports this line 
of reasoning. It shows that intra-industry trade should be more sizeable between neighbouring 
countries while being more sensitive to trade costs at the same time. The reduction of tariffs that 
is provided for in the GAFTA agreement may therefore allow countries that are close to each 
other to develop such trade. More distant countries do not have the possibility to develop intra- 
industry trade and therefore focus on inter-industry trade that is spurred by the exploitation of 
comparative advantages, namely marked differences in production costs, and is therefore less 
sensitive to transport costs. As the volume of trade increases between neighbouring countries, 
one should therefore also observe a variation in the composition of traded goods. More precisely, 
the share of intra-industry trade in total trade should accordingly increase. 
4. Sector impact of trade integration with the European 
Union 
Two strategies are available to estimate the impact of the Euromed agreement on Morocco's 
industries. The first one is to simulate the trade liberalisation shock in a calibrated model of the 
Moroccan economy. This is the route followed by Chater (2004) and that we present in subsection 
4. I. The second route consists of using available estimates of the sensitivity to price differences 
of Moroccan exports. This is what we do in section 4.2. 
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4.1. A Simulation based on a computable general equilibrium 
model 
Chater (2004) studies the impact of an elimination of Moroccan protection on imports from the 
European Union. With this end in view, he builds and uses a computable general equilibrium model 
of the Moroccan economy. Although the range of trade-policy scenarios that he studies his more 
limited than that of Rutherford et al. (1997), his model incorporates several improvements with 
respect to Rutherford et al. (I 997)'s. We must therefore present his modelling strategy before 
presenting his chief results. 
Chater (2004)'s model decomposes the Moroccan economy in thirteen production sectors that 
correspond to Morocco's national accounting's sectors. Agriculture is split in three sectors that 
differ with respect to their trade with the European Union. The manufacturing industry is 
decomposed in four sectors, along the lines of Moroccan national accounting (food industry, 
intermediary goods, capital goods, and final goods). The construction and public works industry 
is represented by one sector, like are non-marketable services. Marketable services, that include 
tourism, are described by a single sector. However, the banking and insurance industry is excluded 
from that sector and considered independently. The remaining sectors are the mining sector, 
which includes phosphates, and the energy sector. 
All sectors use labor and capital as their inputs. The former is heterogeneous. Namely, three levels 
of skills are required in the production process. Labor is mobile between sectors but capital is not. 
However, sectors differ in two ways that are Chater (2004)'s model's two main specificities. 
Namely, the model allows the introduction of imperfect competition of the economy and the 
possibility of increasing returns in some sectors. More precisely, all manufacturing sectors, the 
mining sector, the energy sector, and the banking and insurance sector exhibit increasing returns 
to scale. Moreover their structure is not competitive. Instead, firms of those sectors behave in a 
Cournot-Nash way. The other sectors are competitive and exhibit constant returns to scale. 
Finally two differences with Rutherford et al. (I 997)'s model remain. First, although it is static 
in nature, it allows considering capital accumulation and investment. Second, the loss of tariff 
revenues is not assumed to be compensated by increases in other taxes. The model therefore 
allows one to investigate the impact of the applied policy on Morocco's public deficit. 
Chater (2004)'s main scenario consists in a complete elimination of Morocco's restrictions on 
the European Union's imports of goods and services. It is assessed against the status quo. That 
policy's global impact is displayed in Table I below. 
It appears that production is slightly adversely affected by trade liberalisation. This, in turn, reduces 
available income but not consumption. Indeed, the reduction of available income is compensated 
by the fall of the price of imported goods. As production diminishes, labor demand is also negatively 
affected. This effect is stronger on skilled labor than on unskilled labor. This reflects Morocco's 
comparative advantage in lower technology productions with respect to the European Union. 
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Table I: Economy-wide effects of the elimination of duties on EU exports 




Variation Labor market Variation 
(%) 
Production 1.6 Tariffs (%) Labordemand 
Available income Direct taxes 54.7 Unskilled lab. demand .1 
Consumption 0.7 lndirecttaxes Skilled labor demand 
Gross investment 10. I Tax income 
Imports 1.3 
Imports EU 7.25 
Imports RoW 
Exports 1.1 
Source: Chater (2004). 
Unsurprisingly, the government budget also faces a negative shock. This is mainly due to the loss 
of tariff revenues but also to the reduction of production that affects indirect taxes. The loss in 
government revenue and available income concur in reducing investment. 
But the policy's most ironic impact can be observed in the balance of payments. Surprisingly, the 
removal of all protection on imports from the European Union only results in a mild increase in 
imports that is almost covered by an increase in exports. The reason for that result is to be found 
in the evolution of imports from the rest of the world. Namely, while European imports soar, 
imports from the rest of the world shrink. These countervailing effects leave the balance of trade 
virtually unchanged. However, this result suggests that a preferential liberalisation of trade with 
the European Union may cause considerable trade diversion. 
Those aggregate results may hide sizeable differences between sectors. This is why Table 2 below 
displays Chater (2004)'s estimates of the effects of trade liberalisation. 









Agri. I -2.7 41.7 -4.4 
Agri. 2 -5.5 31.2 -6.1 
Agri. 3 -2.6 -2.6 
Mining -0.3 7.1 -3.4 0.5 
Energy -0.1 26 -4.7 2.8 
Food -0.4 22.2 -4.7 2.1 
Manuf. goods 0.2 12.1 -8.9 3.3 
Interm. goods -0.3 11.7 -4.7 2.2 
Capital goods -5.1 - II 0.4 
Construction -8.8 
Service -0.7 0.7 -2.1 0.3 
Banking - I .4 
Public 0 
Total -1.6 7.25 -6,2 1.1 
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Following Chater (2004), the sector effects of trade liberalisation can be summarised by considering 
three groups of sectors. The first group consists of the two first agricultural sectors. The second 
group is made of the two sectors that produce investment goods (capital and construction). The 
third and last group gathers all the other marketable sectors. 
The first group was heavily protected. The removal of existing protection is therefore associated 
with a reduction of their production due to a massive increase in European imports. However, 
the reduction of their production remains limited. The investment goods sectors are more 
negatively affected. They suffer from the reduction of national savings, both private and public. 
All the other sectors are only moderately affected by the trade policy shock. The production of 
final goods even marginally increases. 
Globally, apart from the three agricultural sectors, all sectors increase their exports. Associated 
with the fall in imports from the rest of the world, this dampens the impact of increased European 
imports on the balance of payments. 
To sum up those results, almost all sectors, including agricultural sectors that were nevertheless 
the most exposed to EU imports, cope reasonably well with the trade policy shock. The two 
sectors that are the main losers of the policy package are the two sectors that produce investment 
goods, namely the construction sector and the capital goods sector. These two sectors are more 
vulnerable because they are hit by the reduction of national savings. 
Those results deserve some qualifications and comments. Indeed, they rest on the hypothesis that 
Morocco reduces its trade protection vis-à-vis the European Union without receiving any trade 
concession in exchange. A simultaneous reduction in European trade restrictions may help 
Moroccan industries to increase their exports and cope better with the policy shock. 
Furthermore, the scenario that has been presented so far assumes that the Moroccan authorities 
just cut down protection on European exports without taking any accompanying measure. This 
is unlikely. Chater (2004) therefore investigates other scenarios, including a fiscal reform, an 
increase in competition, an improvement of Moroccan firms' productivity, and an active exchange- 
rate policy. He then shows that those policies could be instrumental in helping Morocco to make 
the most of its trade policy reform. 
4.2. An Estimation based on econometric results 
The previous section assessed the effects on Morocco's trade of a reduction of its own trade 
protection. Now, the Euromed process entails a reduction of trade restrictions on both sides of 
the Mediterranean. To gauge the possible effects of a reduction of the European Union's trade 
protection we resort to the estimates of sectors' sensitivity to relative costs computed by Achy 
and Sekkat (2003). 
These authors estimated exports equations for eleven sectors of five MENA countries, namely 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, and Turkey. Among other determinants of exports to the 
European Union, they investigated the impact of the real exchange rate. In other words, their 
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analysis provides an estimate of the elasticity of exports of MENA economies to the European 
Union to the relative costs between the exporting country and the importing zone. If one assumes 
that trade liberalisation implies a diminution of the relative cost of Moroccan products vis-à-vis 
their European substitutes, this figure can be used to assess the impact of the Euromed agreement 
on Morocco's exports. 
In their paper, Achy and Sekkat (2003) estimate several specifications of their exports equation. 
Those different specifications lead to different estimates of the elasticities of exports to the real 
exchange rate. For each sector, we picked up the smallest and the largest significant coefficient. 
Those coefficients give us the upper and lower bounds of the sensitivity of Morocco's exports to 
the reduction in relative costs in the event of an elimination of the European Union's tariffs. They 
are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Estimated elasticities of Moroccan exports to the real exchange rate 
Sector Low elasticity High elasticity 
Energy 0.4 I .69 
Food and agriculture 0.58 0.93 
Textiles 1.41 2.32 
Wood and paper 0.49 I .38 
Chemicals 0.24 0.93 
Iron and Steel 1.03 1.16 
Nonferrous 0.99 I .03 
Mechanical 0.98 I .77 
Vehicles 1.7 3.66 
Electrical I .01 3.05 
Electronic 0.61 2.29 
Source: Achy and Sekkat (2003). 
Those figures may be difficult to interpret as such. We therefore summarize the information of 
Table 3 in Figure 8 below. In that figure, sectors are ranked by order of increasing elasticity to the 
real exchange rate. By elasticity here, we mean the average of estimated elasticity in Achy and 
Sekkat (2003)'s various specifications, when the estimated coefficient was statistically significant. 
Each average point estimate is complemented by the two extreme values assumed by the estimated 
parameter. 
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Figure 8: Estimated elasticities to the real exchange rate of Morocco's exports sectors 
Although some uncertainty exists as to the true values of the parameters, a general pattern seems 
to emerge from Figure 8. Some sectors appear to be much more sensitive to the real exchange 
rate than others. Those differences may be explained by the homogeneity of the exported goods 
and by the size of the exporter's comparative advantage. The more homogeneous a product, the 
more sensitive its exports will be to differences in prices. On the other hand, if the exporter's 
comparative advantage is large enough, variations of the real exchange rate will not suffice to 
compensate it. 
However, the point here is not to explain why some sectors are more sensitive to price differences 
than others but to investigate the impact of those differences on Morocco's trade. It is reasonable 
to assume that more sensitive sectors will benefit more from the reduction of the European 
Union's trade protection. If all sectors benefit from the same relative reduction of their price on 
the European market, those sectors whose elasticity to the real exchange rate is larger than one 
should see their share in Morocco's exports increase. Those sectors whose elasticity to the 
exchange rate is lower than one should see their share in Morocco's exports diminish. 
If we focus on the average estimates of exports sensitivities to the real exchange rate, one may 
thus infer that the shares of the energy, iron and steel, mechanical, electronic, textiles, electrical, 
and vehicles sectors in Morocco's exports to the European Union should increase with trade 
Iiberalisation. On the opposite, the chemicals, food and agriculture, and wood and paper sectors 
should represent a lower share of the kingdom's exports after trade liberalisation. The non-ferrous 
sector, whose elasticity is close to one, should keep a constant share of the country's exports to 
the European Union. 
To get an intuition of what those results may imply for Morocco's trade, Figure 9 below plots the 
estimated sensitivity of Morocco's exports against each sector's actual share in the country's 
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Source: Achy and Sekkat (2003). 
That figure reveals that there is no linear relationship between a sector's share in Morocco's 
exports and its sensitivity to relative price differences. Among Morocco's three leading exporting 
sectors, two, i.e. the chemical and the food and agriculture sectors, exhibit an elasticity that is 
lower than one. Only does the textiles sector exhibit an elasticity that is greater than one. As it 
is Morocco's main exporting sector, and totals 46% of the country's exports, the liberalisation 
of exports to the European Union may further increase Morocco's specialisation in the textiles 
industry. 
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Besides, it appears, that the electronic sector, which is Morocco's fourth exporting sector, also 
happens to be sensitive to price differences. It may therefore reap an above average benefit from 
trade liberalisation. On the other hand, that sector's elasticity is lower than the elasticity of the 
textiles sector. It will therefore only marginally contribute to reduce Morocco's specialisation in 
the textile industry. 
Those contentions should however be taken with care. Indeed, the impact of the Euromed trade 
agreement not only depends on the elasticity of each sector's exports but also on the level and 
reduction of tariffs that impede that sector's exports. Depending on the speed and nature of the 
European Union's trade concessions, the results may differ markedly. 
Moreover, the evolution of Morocco's exports will not only depend on the revisions of the 
European trade policy spurred by the Euromed process, but on the evolution of the Union's trade 
policy as a whole. In particular, the end of the MultiFibre Agreement in 2005 will automatically 
affect the competitiveness of Moroccan exports to a great extent. As the Moroccan textile industry 
already benefits of a quasi-free access to the European market, the abolition of the MFA will in 
fact represent a "de-protection" of Moroccan exporters. Namely, for the Moroccan textile industry, 
the end of the MFA simply means that Chinese textiles can be imported without impediment on 
the European market. It will therefore only result in increased competition for Moroccan exports 
that may in fact decrease after 2005. At best, the Euromed process may help limit the decrease 
of Moroccan exports. 
58 
5. Conclusion 
This report has briefly reviewed the existing literature on Morocco's trade and trade policy, and 
interpreted available evidence to provide rough estimates of the possible effects of the process 
of multiple regional trade integration to which the country is participating. It appears that multiple 
trade agreements cannot be assimilated to a sum of separate agreements. Instead, they may 
produce specific effects, both economic and political, that exceed the simple addition of separate 
agreements. The number of existing agreements, the order in which they are signed, and the 
compatibility of their provisions matter in determining the consequences of a country's trade 
policy. 
Because of the complexity of the issues involved, we had to study the effects of Euromed and 
GAFTA separately. Inspection of the present state of Morocco's trade with both Europe and its 
Arab partners reveals that its volume is probably lower than what it could be. It is at any rate 
lower than what is observed among other partners of similar characteristics. This finding suggests 
the existence of a potential for increasing the Kingdom's exports by taking part in regional trade 
agreements. 
Yet, it is not clear whether trade integration will suffice in filling Morocco's trade gap. However, 
available estimates, though of limited reliability, suggest that trade integration may be beneficial. 
Other effects should also be expected. Namely, available results indicate that the Euromed 
agreement may cause trade diversion. In other words, increased trade with the European Union 
may be associated with lower trade with the rest of the world. As regards GAFTA, our analysis 
suggests that it may alter the geographic repartition of trade inside the Arab area. In the case of 
Europe, available evidence allowed to investigate the consequences of the Euromed process at 
the sectoral level. Our analysis implies that the industry composition of Morocco's exports may 
be altered by the elimination of European barriers to trade. 
In any case, those conclusions must be interpreted with utmost care. Indeed, the actual evolution 
of Morocco's trade, and its impact on the country's economy and welfare, will eventually depend 
not only on its trade policy but also on the evolution of the trade policy of the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, the benefits and costs of Morocco's trade policy will depend on the accompanying 
measures that it will implement. 
Those concluding remarks therefore mean that further research is warranted. To obtain more 
reliable estimates of the costs and benefits of Morocco's trade policy, more specific scenarios, 
involving different accompanying policies, should be investigated. Moreover, the issue of spaghetti 
regionalism should be tackled directly. This calls, among others, for an analysis of the compatibility 
and the economic consequences of different rules of origin. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Moroccan trade-related legislative texts in force (March 2003). 




Law No. 13-89 on Foreign Trade 
. 
Implementing decrees for Law No. I 3-89 on Foreign 
Trade 
1992, amended in 1997 
1993, 2000 
Customs Customs and Indirect Taxation Code 1977, amended in 2000 
regulations 
Seven implementing decrees for the Customs Code 1977, 1995, 1996, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2002 
Finance Law (simplification of customs clearance 1995 
procedures) 
Decree determining the procedures for implementing the 1957, 1961, 1998 
new free industrial warehouse customs regime established 
under the Finance Law 
Two Dahirs determining the rate of the customs tariff on 2002 
imports and the amount of import duty; Decree amending 
the amount of duty imposed on the import of certain 
goods 
Decree suspending import duties and value added tax Ofl 1997, 1998, 1999,, 2000, 
the import of certain types of barley 2001 
16 Decrees amending the amount of customs duty imposed 2001 
on the import of certain products 
Two Decrees suspending import duties and value added 1985 
tax on the import of certain products 
Law No. 30-85 on value added tax (establishment of value 1986, 1992, 1994, 1996, 
added tax) 




Decree establishing the parafiscal import tax for economic 
financing and the inspection of exports at a rate of 0.25 
percent ad valorem 
1994 










Decree determining the rate of veterinary sanitary 
inspection fees for the import of animals, animal foodstuffs, 









Law No. 15-95 containing the Commercial Code 1996 
Pricing and 
competition 
Law No. 06-99 on Pricing Freedom and Competition and 




Law No. 19-94 on Free Export Zzones and its 
implementing decree 
Decrees Nos. 2-96-5 I I and 2-96-5 I 2 on the creation of 
the Tangiers and Nador free export zones 
Decree No. 2-98-99 granting the concession for the 
development and management of the Tangiers free export 
zone to the "Tanger Free Zone" company 
Decree-Law No. 2-02-644 creating the Tanger- 







Decree on government procurement 1999 
Commercial 
courts 
Law establishing the Commercial Courts 1997 
SPS Law No. 24-89 laying down veterinary sanitary control 
measures for the import of animals, animal foodstuffs, 
products, products of animal origin, animal reproduction 
products, freshwater and marine products, and its 
implementing decree determining veterinary sanitary 
control measures for the import of animals 
Decree No. 2-94-74 fixing the fees for veterinary sanitary 
inspection for the import of animals, animal foodstuffs, 
products of animal origin, animal reproduction products, 




Area Legislative text Date of entry into force 
SPS Decree No. 2-94-729 on the suspension of duties 
and taxes on the import of pure-bred live breeding 
animals of the camelidae species 
1994 
New Law No. 9-94 on the protection of new varieties of plants 1997 
varieties of and its implementing texts 
plants 
Decree No. 2-01-2324 implementing Law No. 9-94 on 2002 
the protection of new varieties of plants 
Dahir No. 1-73-439 enacting the International Plant 1974 
Protection Convention done at Rome in 195 I 
Four Dahirs regulating the sanitary inspection of plants 1927, 1949, 1950, 1954 
Law No. 1-76-472 amending Dahir No. 1-69-69 (1969) 1969, 1977 
regulating the production and marketing of seeds and 
seedlings 
Law No. 42-95 on the control and organization of trade 1997 
in pesticides for agricultural use 
Dahir on the import of cotton seeds and the growing of 1939 
cotton 
Decree No. 2-63-369 banning the import and transit of 1963 
all plants or parts thereof belonging to the eucalyptus 
genus Herit, Myrtacea family 
1997 
Decree No. 2-97-5 12 on security for the proper conduct 
of import operations for cereals and pulses. 
Dahir fixing the fee for sanitary inspection of imports and 1933 
exports of plants, parts thereof, or plant products 
Dahir on the control of exports of fruit and early fruit and 1932 
vegetables of Moroccan origin 
Labelling Decree fixing the labelling requirements for foodstuffs 2002 
Intellectual 
property 
Dahir on industrial property rights 
Law No. 17-97 on industrial property protection, enacted 
in 2000 
1916 
Not yet in force 
Law No. I 3-99 establishing the Moroccan Office for 
Industrial and Commercial Property (OMPIC) 
2000 
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Area Legislative text Date of entry into force 
Law No. 2-00 on copyright and related rights 




Investment Framework Law No. 18-95 constituting the Investment 
Charter 
Decree No. 2-00-895 implementing Articles I 7 and 19 
of Framework Law No. 18-95 
Decree No. 2-02-350 approving the single form for the 






Dahir No. 1-69-25, as amended and supplemented by 
Dahir No. 1-97-I 71 and Dahir No. 1-01-55 constituting 
the Agricultural Investment Code 
Decree No. 2-98-365 establishing a premium for certain 
agricultural investment 
Decree No. 2-98-366 establishing a premium for the 
upgrading of citrus fruit products 
Decree No. 2-98-367 supplementing Decree No. 2-85- 
891 determining the procedure for distribution of the 
financial support granted by the State in order to intensify 
agricultural production 
Decree No. 2-85-891, as subsequently amended 
Decree No. 2-69-3 I 3, as amended and supplemented 
by Decree No. 2-01-1966 regulating State incentives for 
the purchase of agricultural equipment 








Handicrafts Law No. 1-73-653 on technical control of the manufacture, 




Dahir No. 1-95-8 enacting Law No. 12-94 on the 
organization of the National Interprofessional Cereals 
and Pulses Board and the organization of the market for 
cereals and pulses 
Dahir No. 1-96-101 enacting Law No. 17-96 




Area Legislative text Date of entry into force 
Decree No. 2-97-5 12, as amended by Decree No. 2-02- 
327 fixing the amount of security for the proper conduct 
of important operations for cereals and pulses 





Dahir No. I -59-367 of 19 February 1960 regulating the 
exercise of the profession of physician, pharmacist, dental 
surgeon, herbalist, and midwife 
Decree No. 2-76-266 of 6 May 1977 on approval of 
authorization for the sale of pharmaceutical specialities 




Hydrocarbons Dahir No. 1-95-141 enacting Law No. 4-95 amending 
and supplementing Law No. 1-72-255 
Decree No. 2-72-5 13 implementing Law No. 1-72-255 




Dahir No. I -99-340 enacting Law No. 27-99 amending 
and supplementing Law No. 21 -90 on prospecting and 
exploiting hydrocarbon deposits 
Decree No. 2-99-210 amending and supplementing 
Decree No. 2-93-786 implementing Law No. 21-90 on 
prospecting and exploiting hydrocarbon deposits 
2000 
2000 
Source: Trade and Industry Department of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Telecommunications (undated), reprint in the 2003 
trade policy review of the WTO. 
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Appendix 2: MFN Duties 
Figure 2.1: Breakdown of MFN duties applied, 2002 





of the total)/ 
r 
Dutyfree 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 >5 
Note: The figures in brackets correspond to the percentage of total lines. 
10- 20 includes tariff lines exceeding 0 per cent but not more than 20 per cent. 
Source : WTO Secretariat calculations based on data provided by the Moroccan authorities. Reprinted in WTO (2003). 
2.2: Breakdown of MFN dwes applied by sector (ISIC , 2002 
Number of lines 















Duty free 0- 0% 10- 20% 20- 30% 30- 40% 40- 50% )50% 
The figures in brackets correspond to the percentage of total lines. 
10-20 per cent includes tariff lines exceeding 10 per cent but not more than 20 per cent. 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data provided by the Moroccan authorities. Reprinted in WTO (2003) 
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Note: The groups of products are defined by two digits in the SIC. 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data provided by the Moroccan authorities. Reprinted in WTO (2003) 
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Appendix 3: Selected indicators of agriculture 
Table 3.1: Tariff commitments of Morocco in the agriculture sector 
Product Base tariff (%) 
(1995) 
Final bound tariff (%) 
(2004) 
Cereals & flour Soft wheat 190.0 144.0 
Durum wheat 224.0 I 70.0 
Soft wheat flour 182.5 139.0 
Sugar Rawand refined sugar 211.0 168.0 




I I I .0/192.5 
215.0 
Refined vegetable oil 3 I I .0 236.0 
Meats Bovine meat 315.0 239.0 
Sheep meat 380.0 289.0 
Poultry 132.5 101.0 
Milk and derivatives Liquid milk I I 5.0 87.0 
Powder milk 115.0 87.0 
Cheese 107.5 82.0 
Source: Moroccos WTO Schedule. 
Table 3.2: Total domestic support (millions of DH) 
Support measures Base period 1995 1996 1997 
(1986-88) 
Measures exempt from reduction 
Green box 
I 576 1340 3 296 3027 
SDT development programs 926 I 261 I 266 I 474 
Sub-total 2 502 2 601 4 562 4 501 
AMS'7 790 94 250 91 
(as%ofAMSceiling) (12) (33) (12) 
Totalsupport 3292 2694 4812 4592 
Sources: Moroccos 1N10 Schedule and notifications to WTO. 













Source: General Agricultural Census (1996) 
A — 1'.) o 0 
V 
— 0 0 0 0 o 0 
AMS: Aggregate Measure of Support includes market price supports, direct payments to producers, and input subsidies. 
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Table 3.3: Irrigation 
Share of irrigated farms Share of irrigated land 
Less than 5 ha 40 19.1 
From Sto 20 ha 34.1 12.3 
From20to50ha 35.1 10.8 
More than 50 ha 44.5 16.8 
All sizes 38.3 14.3 
Source: General Agricultural Census (1996). 
Figure 3.2: Agriculture value added as a share of GDP) 
unI ii iliIii I 
1980 1981 1985 1990 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 








Figure 3.4: Share of agricultural exports in the total exports and share of agricultural 
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Appendix 4: Method used to measure the kilometric equivalent of a tariff duty 
Let us assume that exports initially face an ad valorem tariff named t. The absolute cost of the 
tariff for one unit of the traded good is therefore where P is the price of the traded good. 
Let us note c, the cost of transporting one dollar of goods over one kilometer. The cost of 
transporting one unit of goods over a distance d is therefore equal to c.d.P Alternatively, one can 
say that the transport cost is c.P per kilometer. 
Given those assumptions, one can compute the "kilometric equivalent" of the tariff duty. It is 
defined as the distance over which the traded good could be transported if the cost of the tariff 
was used to finance additional transport instead. The kilometric equivalent of the ad valorem duty 
is therefore equal to t.P I c.P = t / c. 
Once an estimate of the tariff's kilometric equivalent is available, one can use it to translate trade 
liberalization in terms of reduced distance. Namely, eliminating the tariff is equivalent to cutting 
down the bilateral distance between to partners by t I c. Given geographic bilateral distance dij, 
this is equivalent to a relative reduction of (t I c) / dij of bilateral distance. If one notes e the 
elasticity of bilateral trade to distance, one can estimate the relative increase of exports from 
country i to countryj: 
AX. =e— (Al) 
X,1 cd,3 
This estimated percentage variation can be used to evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on 
the volume of Morocco's exports and also on the share of its partners in its trade. 
In our estimations, the exporting country is always Morocco. The importing country can be any 
of its Arab trading partners. Bilateral distance is the usual direct distance between capital cities. 
We use the elasticity of bilateral trade to distance computed for African trade by Longo and Sekkat 
(2004). Its point estimate amounts to 3.14. 
To calibrate our simulations, we needed a reasonable estimate of transport costs per dollar per 
kilometer. We found statistics of transport costs in Hummels (2001) and derived our estimates 
from them. However, transport costs can widely vary between sectors. As our computations are 
run on aggregate data, we used two values of c: 0.000192 and 0.00096. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.6: Customs reforms 
Customs clearance Reform of the Custom Code: Law 02/99 on Customs and Indirect 
procedures taxation code 
Substantial reduction of customs clearance time 
Use of a computer system for handling customs clearance 
A multilingual customs website available for the public 
Customs clearance Single Declaration of Goods (DUM) 
documents 
Since the 5th of October 1998, the principal method used for customs 
valuation has been the transaction value3. 
Reference prices abolished on the of August 200232. 
Appendix 6: Trade and trade policy 
Table 6.1: Morocco: Structure of imports, 1994-200 ia (US$ millions and percentage) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200! 
Total imports 7,193.7 8,540.5 8,253.5 7,877.5 10,287.3 10,787.6 11,533.4 11,034.0 
(percentage) 
Primary products, total 39.4 43.6 43.2 42.2 29.5 31.3 37.0 37.5 
Agriculture 20.5 25.9 24.1 22.1 18.0 16.7 16.8 17.5 
Food products 14.5 19.5 18.9 16.6 14.2 13.3 13.7 14.4 
0412 Other wheat and meslin, not 1.9 4.7 4.8 3.3 2.8 2.7 3.3 3.5 
milled 
0411 Durum wheat, not milled 0.3 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 
0611 Raw cane or beet sugar 
4211 Soyabean oil and fractions 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 
thereof 
I .5 0.9 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.1 
0449 Maize, not milled 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0430 Barley, not milled 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 
Agricultural raw materials 6.0 6.3 5.3 5.5 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.2 
Miningand quarrying 18.9 17.8 19.1 20.1 11.5 14.6 20.2 20.0 
Ores and other minerals 2.1 2.6 2.2 2.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 
2741 All types of sulphur (except for 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.9 
sublimated sulphur) 
Non-ferrous metals 1.4 .4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Fuel 15.5 13.7 15.6 16.5 9.0 12.3 17.7 17.6 
3330 Crude petroleum oil 10.5 9.2 10.3 11.2 5.5 8.4 12.0 11.6 
3425 Liquified butane 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.2 1.5 2.2 1.9 
3343 Diesel fuel 0.0 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.5 
3212 Other oils, including pulverized 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.4 
31 
Prior to the 5th of October 1998, Morocco used the Brussels definition. 32 
Decree No. 2-02-347 of the I of July 2002 repealing Decree No. 2-98-517 of the 29th of September 1998 fixing the minimum 
values for goods at the customs and the list of goods to which they apply. 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Manufactures 60.6 56.3 56.7 57.8 70.5 68.7 62.9 62.4 
Iron and steel 6.6 5.7 4.4 4.6 4.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 
6726 Semi-finished products of steel 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.7 
alloy 
Chemicals 12.2 11.9 12.7 12.4 10.5 9.4 8.7 9.7 
Other semi-finished products 5.9 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.3 5.7 5.1 5.3 
Transport machinery and equipment 27.1 23.3 23.6 24.3 28.6 29.8 27.5 24.4 
Machinery for producing energy 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 2.6 2.8 0.7 0.4 
Other non-electrical machinery 10.3 10.8 10.8 9.6 8.5 8.3 6.9 7.4 
Tractors and agricultural machinery 1.2 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Office and telecommunications 3.6 2.8 3.5 3.6 7.0 8.4 10.5 7.5 
equipment 
7643 Transmitters for radiotelephony, 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 4.2 1.9 
television, etc. 
7763 Diodes, transistors, etc. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.1 3.1 2.0 1.8 
7641 Electrical appliances for 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.8 
telephony, etc. 
Other electrical machinery 3.0 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.4 
Products of the automobile industry 3.9 3.7 4.7 5.4 4.9 5.0 4.1 4.6 
7812 Motor vehicles for transport of 1.2 1.1 2.2 2.3 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.8 
passengers, n.e.s. 
7821 Automobiles for transport of 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.0 
goods 
Other transport equipment 4.6 2.6 1.5 2.3 3.0 2.5 2.4 1.0 
7924 Aircraft, etc. > 15,000 kg. 2.9 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.0 
Textiles 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 14.0 13.0 11.8 12.7 
6524 Other fabrics, containing at least 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.2 
85 percent of cotton by weight> 
200g/m2 
6552 Other knitted or crocheted 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 
fabrics 
Clothing 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.3 
Other consumer goods 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.3 4.5 4.7 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Gold 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
a The change in the method of entering sub-contracting transactions in the accounts in 1998 makes it difficult to compare 
statistics for the period prior to 1998 and those for later. Temporary entry imports were not entered as transactions in 
goods prior to 1998, but have been entered as such since then. For example, temporary entry imports without payment 
amounted to the following (in US$ million): 1,097.1 in 1994; 1,478.3 in I 995; 1,451.3 in I 996; and 1,647.0 in 1997. 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data taken from the Comtrade database (UNSD) (ISIC, Rev.3); data provided by 
the Moroccan authorities. 
82 
Table 6.2: Morocco: Structure of exports, 1994-2001 a (US$ millions and percentage) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total exports 4,034.6 4,718.9 4,742.0 4,674.2 7,155.3 7,502.9 7,431.8 7,136.8 
(percentage) 
Primary products, total 46.5 48.6 49.7 50.6 34.5 34.6 35.9 35.1 
Agriculture 31.8 34.8 35.4 33.5 22.8 22.6 23.5 22.4 
Food products 28.4 31.4 32.9 30.9 21.2 20.9 21.5 21.0 
0363 Molluscs 8.8 9.8 9.1 7.8 5.6 5.3 7.8 5.6 
0371 Fish preparations or preserved 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 
fish, n.e.s. 
0571 Oranges, etc. 3.7 4.3 6.5 5.3 3.8 3.5 2.6 2.6 
0567 Vegetable preparations or 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.7 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.3 
preserved vegetables, n.e.s. 
Agricultural raw materials 3.4 3.4 2.5 2.6 1.5 1.7 2.0 1.4 
Mining and quarrying 14.7 13.7 14.3 17.0 11.7 12.0 12.4 12.7 
Ores and other minerals 11.1 10.0 11.0 13.2 8.9 8.1 7.3 7.1 
2723 Natural calcium phosphate 7.0 6.0 7.3 9.3 6.4 6.1 5.2 5.2 
Non-ferrous metals 1.5 1.5 1.6 .9 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Fuel 2.1 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.5 2.7 3.7 4.2 
3341 Petrolformotorsandotherlight 2.1 2.2 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.5 
oils 
3343 Diesel fuel 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.6 2.1 
Manufactures 53.5 51.4 50.3 49.4 65.5 65.3 64.1 64.7 
Iron and steel 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 
Chemicals 20.2 20.8 20.1 20.8 12.6 12.9 12.0 12.2 
5223 Inorganic acids, etc. 11.7 11.7 11.1 12.4 7.0 7.8 6.8 6.3 
5629 Mineral or chemical phosphate 0.2 0.1 0.6 2.9 3.7 3.3 3.3 4.0 
fertilizers, n.e.s. 
Other semi-finished products 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.3 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.3 
Transport machinery and equipment 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.0 8.8 10.6 11.0 10.8 
Machinery for producing energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other non-electrical machinery 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Tractors and agricultural machinery 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Office and telecommunications 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.6 7.1 6.8 5.6 
equipment 
7763 Diodes, transistors, etc. 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 5.3 6.0 5.3 
Other electrical machinery 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.8 3.4 3.8 
7731 Wires, cables and other insulated 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.6 3.2 
conductors for electricity, etc. 
Products of the automobile industry 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 
Othertrarisportequipment 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Textiles 3.8 3.8 3.3 2.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.0 
Clothing 18.3 16.9 16.4 15.5 35.5 33.3 32.3 32.8 
8414 Trousers, bib and brace overalls 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.0 6.9 6.1 5.5 5.5 
etc. 
83 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
8426 Trousers, bib and brace overalls 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 4.3 4.4 5.0 5.6 
etc. 
8454 T-Shirts and vests, knitted 1.3 1.3 1.3 .4 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.7 
8453 Sweaters, pullovers, etc. 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.5 
8455 Brassieres, corsets, etc. 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.6 
8415 Shirts and polo shirts 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.5 
8427 Ladies shirts and blouses 0.2 0.1 0.1 0. I 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 
8425 Skirts and divided skirts 0.2 0. I 0.1 0.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 
8458 Other clothing, not knitted or 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 
crocheted 
Other consumer goods 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.5 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.4 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Gold 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
a The change in the method of entering sub-contracting transactions in the accounts in I 998 makes it difficult to compare 
statistics for the period prior to 1998 and those for later. Temporary entry imports were not entered as transactions in 
goods prior to 1998, but have been entered as such since then. For example, temporary entry imports without payment 
amounted to the following (in US$ million): 1,566.8 in 1994; 2,158.3 in 1995; 2,140.5 in 1996; and 2,362.0 in 1997. 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data taken from the Comtrade database (UNSD) (ISIC, Rev.3); data provided by 
the Moroccan authorities. 
Table 6.3: Morocco: Origin of imports, 1994-2001 a (US$ millions and percentage) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total imports 7,193.7 8,540.5 8,253.5 7,877.5 10,287.3 10,787.6 I l.533.4 11,036.7 
(percentage) 
America 14.2 12.7 15.1 14.2 11.8 11.0 10.7 9.9 
United States 8.6 6.5 7.4 6.5 6.3 6.5 5.6 3.7 
Canada 0.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 .3 1.3 2.0 2.0 
Other countries in America 4.7 4.2 5.5 5.6 4.3 3.2 3.2 4.2 
Brazil 2.1 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.5 2.5 
Argentina 1.0 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.3 0.7 0.9 1.3 
Europe 62.6 66.4 61.7 59.8 69.7 68.2 64.3 62.6 
EU(15) 56.5 56.: 54.! 52.! 62.7 60.6 57.9 54.0 
France 22.6 21.8 20.8 20.7 26.3 25.8 24.0 22.5 
Spain 8.8 8.5 8.8 9.0 10.3 11.1 9.9 9.5 
United Kingdom 2.8 3.6 2.8 2.8 5.4 5.4 6.2 5.4 
Italy 6.8 5.7 7.2 6.1 6.0 5.3 4.7 5.2 
Germany 7.0 6.3 6.1 5.0 6.8 6.0 4.9 5.1 
Netherlands 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Belgium and Luxembourg 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.5 
84 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sweden .8 2.1 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.2 1.3 
Finland 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.5 
EFTA 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 
Switzerland 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Eastern Europe 3.9 7.8 5.4 5.6 4.4 5.1 4.2 6.1 
former USSR 1.8 4.4 3.5 3.8 2.7 3.7 3.2 4.9 
Russian Federation 1.5 3.3 2.8 2.4 1.3 2.6 2.2 3.4 
Other European countries 0.7 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.2 
Asia 15.6 14.8 14.4 17.5 13.6 16.3 20.0 19.1 
Middle East 9.9 8.7 7.3 9.0 5.9 8.4 12.8 11.5 
Saudi Arabia 5.4 5.3 6.0 6.9 3.3 3.2 5.0 4.7 
Iraq 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.0 2.3 4.1 3.7 
Islamic Republic of Iran 2.7 2.4 0.7 0.3 1.0 2.2 3.1 2.6 
Far East 5.4 5.7 6.4 7.9 7.2 7.4 6.7 6.9 
China 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 
Japan 1.7 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.5 
Republic of Korea 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 











































a The change in the method of entering sub-contracting transactions in the accounts in 1998 makes it difficult to compare 
statistics for the period prior to 1998 and those for later. Temporary entry imports were not entered as transactions in 
goods prior to I 998, but have been entered as such since then. For example, temporary entry imports without payment 
amounted to the following (in US$ million): 1,097.1 in 1994; 1,478.3 in 1995; 1,451.3 in 996; and 1,647.0 in 1997. 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data taken from the Comtrade database (UNSD) (ISIC, Rev.3); data provided by 
the Moroccan authorities. 
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Table 6.4: Morocco: Destination of exports, 1994-2001 a (US$ millions and percentage) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total exports 4,034.6 4,718.9 4,742.0 4,674.2 7,155.3 7,502.9 7,431.8 7,144. I 
(percentage) 
America 5.9 6.1 6.6 6.9 5.4 5.7 5.6 6.5 
United States 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 2.8 3.4 3.4 3.9 
Canada 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Other countries in America 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.8 2.2 
Brazil 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.1 
Mexico 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 
Europe 67.4 66.1 66.3 65.7 76.9 76.3 78.1 75.5 
EU(l5) 64.0 62.1 61.5 60.7 72.9 73.2 74.7 72.5 
France 31.7 29.7 28.3 27.0 34.8 35.8 33.5 32.5 
Spain 9.3 9.4 9.9 10.8 10.2 10.7 13.0 14.6 
United Kingdom 3.9 4.5 3.9 3.8 9.5 8.9 9.6 8.2 
Italy 5.7 5.7 6.3 6.4 5.0 5.1 7.1 5.7 
Germany 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.4 6.0 5.7 5.0 4.7 
Belgium and Luxembourg 3.4 3.! 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.5 
Netherlands 2.9 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.7 2.1 
Portugal 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
EFTA 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 
Eastern Europe 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.4 
Former USSR 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Russian Federation 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Other European countries 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.7 
Turkey 0.8 1.0 1.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 
Asia 18.0 18.8 18.7 19.0 12.2 12.4 11.5 10.8 
Middle East 3.3 2.6 3.1 3.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.1 
Saudi Arabia 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Islamic Republic of Iran 1.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Far East 8.2 9.2 8.1 7.3 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.0 
Japan 6.6 7.7 6.9 5.5 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.0 
China 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 
South Asia 6.5 7.0 7.4 8.6 5.0 5.5 4.6 4.1 
India 6.4 6.6 6.3 8.3 4.5 4.8 4.2 3.4 
Pacific 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.1 
New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 
Africa 7.6 8.0 7.3 6.7 4.4 4.4 3.7 4.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.1 
Other African countries 6.0 5.9 4.8 4.1 2.4 2.4 (.9 2.1 
LibyanArabJamahiriya 2.5 3.4 2.6 2.8 .4 1.5 0.8 0.8 
Tunisia 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 
0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.9 
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a The change in the method of entering sub-contracting transactions in the accounts in 
1998 makes it difficult to compare statistics for the period prior to 1998 and those for 
later. Temporary entry imports were not entered as transactions in goods prior to 1998, 
but have been entered as such since then. For example, temporary entry imports without 
payment amounted to the following (in US$ million): I ,566.8 in 1994; 2, 158.3 in 1995; 
2,140.5 in 1996; and 2,362.0 in 1997. 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data taken from the Comtrade database (UNSD) (ISIC, Rev.3); data provided by 
the Moroccan authorities. 
Table 6.5: Morocco: binding of tariff quotas 
Description 
of product 




Rate applied in 2002a 
(outside quota) 
Final bound rate 
(outside quota) 
Bovine meat 0201 and 0202 5,000 82.5% 60 and 284% 239% 
Sheep meat 0204 3,300 82.5% 339% 289% 
Poultry meat 0207 6,400 62.5% 50%- 28% 34% and 101% 
Milk 0401.20 38,600 96.0% 112% 87% 
Wheat 1001 1555,340 144.0% 2.5% and 535b 34% - 170% 
Barley 1003 2,770 113.0% 2.5%and36.5%b 19%and 113% 
Maize 1005 204,400 122.0% 25%b 19 % and 122% 
Rice 1006 7,200 177.0% 2.5% and I 75%b 19% - 195% 
Sorghum 1007 9,230 165.0% 25%b 34% and 165% 
Soyabeans 1201 17,700 111.0% 25%b 19%and 111% 
Groundnuts 1202 0 59.0% 2.5% - 72.5% 34% and 59% 
Sunflower seeds 1205 4,400 146.0% 2.5% and 17•5%b 34% - 158% 
1206 0 139.0% 2•5%b 34%and 139% 
Cottonseed 1207 0 127.0% 2.5%- 157% 34%- 127% 
Oil 1507- 1510 196,110 215.0% 2.5%-53.5% 8%-236% 
and 1512- 
1518 
Sugar 1701 274,340 68.0% 
25% 55% 
Sunflower seed oil 2306.30 1,000 62.0% 25% 62% 
cake 
Colza seed oil-cake 2306.40 200 72.0% 25% 72% 
a In practice, the ex-quota rates apply to all imports of the products in question; rates within the quotas have not been 
applied. 
b Including variable rates of the type: 30% for the part of the declared value of DH 700/tonne or less, the part exceeding 
DH 700/tonne is subject to a 16% import duty. 
Source: WTO, Schedule LXXI — Morocco; Moroccan authorities; WTO CTS database. 
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16,676 All products combined 33.4 0—339 24.7 11,036.7 
2,395 HSOI-24 53.2 0—339 45.1 1,622.4 
14,281 HS 25-97 30.1 0— 50 17.2 9,414.4 
2,290 Agriculture (WTO definition) 50.7 0— 339 47.4 1,675.2 
14,386 Non-agricultural products (including 30.7 0— 50 17.1 9,361.5 
petroleum products) 
14,358 Non-agricultural products (excluding 30.7 0— 50 17.1 7,893.9 
petroleum products) 











01 7! Liveanimals 83.4 2.5—339 101.5 8.4 
02 149 Meat and edible meat offal 141.2 50— 339 110.3 2.1 
03 234 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 49.6 17.5 — 50 3.3 6.4 
aquatic invertebrates 
04 172 Dairy produce; birds eggs; natural honey; 85.5 17.5 — 112 35.1 88.8 
edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
specified or included 
05 60 Products of animal origin, not elsewhere 35.8 2.5 — 53.5 14.0 5.3 
specified or included 
06 45 Live trees and other plants; bulbs. roots and 29.7 2.5 — 50 20.2 6.7 
the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage 
07 160 Ediblevegetables and certain roots and tubers 45.5 2.5—53.5 10.5 39.2 
08 117 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 50.6 50— 53.5 1.3 19.1 
melons 
09 72 Coffee. tea. maté and spices 39.7 2.5 — 50 7.1 93.2 
10 45 Cereals 20.6 2.5—53.5 14.5 794.4 
II 144 Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; 53.4 32.5— 105 14.9 2.3 
inulin; wheat gluten 
12 125 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 29.6 2.5 — 157 33.9 88.2 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder 
13 24 Lac; gums. resins and other vegetable saps and 28.9 7.5 — 50 8.8 2.3 
extracts 
14 61 Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products 28.6 2.5 — 50 I 3.0 0.4 
not elsewhere specified or included 
15 136 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 31.4 2.5 — 53.5 15.7 159.3 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal 
or vegetable waxes 
16 83 Preparations of meat. of fish or of crustaceans. 50. I 50 — 53.5 0.7 2.9 














17 96 Sugars and sugar confectionery 37.2 17.5 — 60 I 3.5 139.6 
18 27 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 47.5 10— 50 8.4 7.5 
19 93 Preparations of cereals. flour, starch or milk; 49.5 32.5—73 8.4 8.5 
pastrycooks products 
20 270 Preparations of vegetables. fruit, nuts or other 49.7 25 — 50 2.0 8.0 
parts of plants 
21 58 Miscellaneous edible preparations 46.0 2.5—53.5 8.8 16.9 
22 88 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 50.8 40— 53.5 1.9 13.3 
23 51 Residues and waste from the food industries; 21.7 2.5 — 60 16.5 74.6 
prepared animal fodder 
24 14 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 23.4 17.5 — 25 3.2 64.9 
25 145 Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering 23.7 0— 50 11.7 129.4 
materials, lime and cement 
26 44 Ores. slag and ash 19.5 2.5 —25 5.2 6.0 
27 113 Mineral fuels. mineral oils and products of their 22.5 2.5 — 50 8.6 1,945.9 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral 
waxes 
28 395 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic 26.0 2.5 — 50 13.0 138.7 
compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth 
metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes 
29 742 Organic chemicals 18.8 2.5 — 50 6.7 157.3 
30 142 Pharmaceutical products 23.9 2.5 —50 11.5 121.9 
31 61 Fertilizers 2.5 2.5 0.0 73.1 
32 98 Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their 26.8 10— 50 17.3 80.3 
derivatives; dyes. pigments and other coloring 
matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other 
mastics; inks 
33 84 Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery. 41.5 17.5 — 50 8.4 45.6 
cosmetic or toilet preparations 
34 70 Soap. organic surface-active agents. washing 36.4 2.5 — 50 16.3 23.9 
preparations. lubricating preparations. artificial 
waxes. prepared waxes, polishing or scouring 
preparations, candles and similar articles. 
modelling pastes. 'dental waxes' and dental 
preparations 
35 48 Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; 31.4 2.5 — 50 15.1 20.0 
glues; enzymes 
36 31 Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; 38.2 2.5 — 50 13.6 2.0 
pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible 
preparations 
37 160 Photographic or cinematographic goods I I . I 2.5 — 50 9,8 18.0 
38 224 Miscellaneous chemical products 25.0 10—50 14.0 118.0 
39 758 Plastics and articles thereof 42.2 2.5 —50 13.3 386.1 
40 239 Rubber and articles thereof 36.9 2.5 — 50 15.6 76.3 
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42 65 Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; 46.7 2.5 — 50 10.8 10.0 
travel goods, handbags and similar containers; 
articles of animal gut 
43 31 Furskins and artificial fur; manufacturers 42.7 25 — 50 11.5 0.3 
thereof 
44 418 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal 34.9 10 — 50 10.8 178.6 
45 33 Cork and articles of cork 44.8 2.5 — 50 10.5 0.1 
46 36 Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other 47.1 32.5 — 50 6.6 0.2 
plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork 
47 53 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic 21.5 2.5 — 32.5 7.7 19.6 
material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper 
and paperboard 
48 423 Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, 45.8 2.5 — 50 9.8 166.2 
of paper or of paperboard 
49 58 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other 3 I .6 2.5 — 50 17.3 43.9 
products of the printing industry; manuscripts, 
typescripts and plans 
50 68 Silk 29.0 2.5—40 11.0 8.9 
51 124 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair 27.3 2.5 —40 15.3 72.1 
yarn and woven fabric 
52 853 Cotton 37.2 2.5—40 5.1 525.2 
53 I 32 Other vegetable textile fibers; paper yarn and 27.9 2.5 — 40 14.9 24.3 
woven fabrics of paper yarn 
54 310 Man-made filaments 35.3 2.5 —40 9.8 114.0 
55 522 Man-made staple fibers 34.7 2.5 —40 10.6 411.2 
56 137 Wadding, felt and non-woven; special yarns; 34.9 2.5 — 50 13.1 57.3 
twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles 
thereof 
57 46 Carpets and other textile floor coverings 50.0 50 0.0 I .2 
58 185 Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; 40.8 40 — 50 2.7 102.5 
lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery 
59 84 Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated 32.9 2.5—50 (3.6 41.1 
textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable 
for industrial use 
60 101 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 40.0 40 0.0 158.3 
61 235 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, 49.3 17.5 — 50 4.5 126.2 
knitted or crocheted 
62 3 18 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, 50.0 50 0.0 112.9 
not knitted or crocheted 
63 186 Other made up textile articles; sets; worn 44.1 2.5 — 50 II .6 11.1 
clothing and worn textile articles; rags 
64 163 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such 50.0 50 0.0 36.7 
articles 













66 IS Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat- 50.0 50 0.0 0.6 
sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof 
67 18 Prepared feathers and down and articles made 21 . I 10 — 50 18.4 2.0 
of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; 
articles of human hair 
68 125 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, 37. I 2.5 — 50 12.8 16.3 
mica or similar materials 
69 104 Ceramic products 41.2 2.5—50 13.7 32.5 
70 242 Glass and glassware 35.1 2.5 — 50 13.9 43.3 
71 145 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi- 35.2 2.5—50 14.6 14.0 
precious stones, precious metals, metals clad 
with precious metal, and articles thereof; 
imitation jeweller>'; coin 
72 614 Iron and steel 20.1 2.5 —50 7.8 331.4 
73 425 Articles of iron or steel 38.5 2.5 — 50 15.0 122.4 
74 297 Copper and articles thereof 28.6 2.5 — 50 13.4 62.8 
Nickel and articles thereof 
75 88 Aluminum and articles thereof 19.3 17.5 — 50 7.6 1.2 
76 133 Lead and articles thereof 33.0 2.5 — 50 15.4 71.0 
78 22 Zinc and articles thereof 41.9 25 — 50 11.2 2.9 
79 19 Tin and articles thereof 24.1 2.5 — 50 12.1 17.2 
80 17 Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof 34.4 17.5 — 50 10.9 0.4 
81 99 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, 36.3 2.5 — 50 I 7.5 0.3 
82 180 of base metal; parts thereof of base metal 21.8 2.5 — 50 22.5 34.3 
83 106 Miscellaneous articles of base metal 45.3 10— 50 9.3 31.4 
84 1,078 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 12.2 2.5 — 50 16.4 1,068.8 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
85 767 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts 19.2 2.5 — 50 17.9 1,066.9 
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, 
television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such 
articles 
86 68 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock 9.0 2.5 — 40 I 3.8 4.6 
and parts thereof; railway or tramway track 
fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; 
mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic 
signaling equipment of all kinds 
87 515 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling- 27.7 2.5 — 50 17.3 535.4 
stock, and parts and accessories thereof 
88 52 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 23.4 2.5 — 50 16.4 22.2 
89 24 Ships, boats and floating structures 3.8 2.5 — 10 2.9 12.6 
90 341 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 7.0 2.5 — 50 9.8 128.6 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 















91 95 Clocks and watches and parts thereof 10.9 2.5 — 40 6.0 I I .2 
92 28 Musical instruments; parts and accessories of 25.7 10 — 50 19.9 0.6 
such articles 
93 64 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories 47.9 I 7.5 — 50 6.3 I .9 
thereof 
94 205 Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress 47.0 2.5—50 10.6 58.3 
supports, cushions and similar stuffed 
furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not 
elsewhere specified or included; illuminated 
signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; 
prefabricated buildings 
95 99 Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and 10.2 2.5—50 4.2 25.4 
accessories thereof 
96 143 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 44.9 2.5—50 12.7 59.7 
97 9 Works of art, collectors pieces and antiques 25.6 17.5 - 50 14.1 0.1 
Source: WTO Secretariat calculations based on data provided by the Moroccan authorities. 





- Progressive approach for liberalizing trade 
. 
- Selective approach 
. 
- Obtain reciprocal or even preferential treatment 
- Better to rely on a set of strategic partners in order to 
• • . • . 
progressively achieve a full integration in the world 
economy 
- Benefit from technical and financial assistance (case of 
MEDA programs with the EU, assistance from US) 
- Burden of managing various and sometimes incompatible 
or conflicting provisions 
- Risks of not applying correctly provisions 
- Lack of harmonization which may be harmful to both 
trade and FDI 
- Depending on its technical capacity and negotiation 
power a country may be forced in a non-multilateral 
agreement to make far concessions in some aspects 
(case of Morocco with the US in TRIPS, and services) 
- Multiplicity of RTAS may weaken developing countries 
bargaining power in multilateral negotiations. 
Private actors 
- Obtain preferential treatment on various markets and 
for a wider range of products 
- Limit the extent of foreign competition by granting 
preferential treatment to a limited number of partners 
- Possibility to engage in selected joint ventures. 
- Increase the gap between MFN and preferential tariff 
rates which restraints trade with countries not belonging 
to any of the RTAS and limits trade diversification. 
Source: table constructed from interviews of a group of entrepreneurs and civil servants involved in foreign Trade activities. 
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